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NOTES
AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
TO SECURE UNIFIED WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT*
FOR thirty years after the construction of the first hydroelectric plant in
the United States, the Federal Government exercised only intermittent con-
trol over the development of power facilities on streams subject to federal
supervision.' The Rivers and Harbors Acts of 18902 and 18998 made
Congressional approval a condition precedent to the erection of dams on
these streams, but federal regulation was almost exclusively concerned with
the elimination of direct obstacles to navigation. 4 Presidents Theodore Roose-
velt, Taft, and Wilson all protested against the prodigality of Congress in
approving unconditional grants of valuable water power sites.6 It was not
until 1920, however, that the first general Federal Water Power Act0 was
passed, and hydroelectric operations were placed under governmental control.
As strengthened and clarified by amendments adopted in 1935,7 the present
Act attempts to substitute unified regional development of electrical facilities
for the piece-meal acquisitive programs of individual utility companies.8
* United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 4th,
1939).
1. Two classes of streams are subject to federal control: "navigable waters of the
United States" which are, "notwithstanding interruptions between the navigable portions
of such streams . . . suitable for the transportation of persons or property in inter-
state or foreign commerce" [49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 796(8) (Supp. 1938)];
and "non-navigable tributaries," which affect the "navigable capacity" of navigable streams
[49 STAT. 846 (1935) ; 16 U. S. C. § 817 (Supp. 1938)].
2. 26 STAT. 450 (1890). For state control prior to the statute, see Wilson v. Black-
bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829); The License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S.
1847).
3. 30 STAT. 1151 (1899).
4. During the period from 1899 to 1910, no project could be constructed on "Navi-
gable Waters of the United States," without first obtaining a Congressional Authorizing
Act. A general enabling act was passed in 1910, 36 STAT. 593. Occasionally these en-
abling acts required project operators to furnish a stated amount of free power to the
United States or made provisions for protection of aquatic life. KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER
POWER LEGISLATION (1926) 86-89.
5. For President Roosevelt's statements, see 36 CoNG. REc. 3071 (1903); 42 id. at
4968 (1908). For Taft's, see SEN. Doc. No. 949, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). For Wil-
son's, see KERWIN, op. cit. supra note 4 at 172. President Roosevelt secured the creation
of a National Waterways Commission, 35 STAT. 818 (1909), whose final report, issued
in 1912, urged that the federal government undertake the unified development of river
systems by means of multi-purpose projects. FINAL REPORT o NATIONAL VATERWAYS
COMMISSION, SEN. Doc. No. 469, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) 52.
6. 41 STAT. 106 (1920); 16 U. S. C. 791 (1934).
7. 49 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§ 791a et seq. (Supp. 1938).
8. See Douglas, Scatteration v. Integration of Public Utility Systems (1938) 24 A.
B. A. J. 800.
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Title I of the Act 9 restricts utility holding companies to control over oper-
ating units within contiguous territory, thereby facilitating the process of
state rate regulation. Titles 1110 and III11 regulate the transfer of physical
assets between companies. and close a pre-existing "twilight zone" of un-
controlled business activity12 by extending the Commission's authority to
the interstate transmission and sale of electrical energy. The "recapture
clause"'13 gives the Federal Government an irrevocable option to purchase
all power facilities erected on a licensed site.
In the absence of a direct grant of constitutional power, the FPC's control
of hydroelectric development was originally made incidental to the protection
and promotion of interstate navigation. Apparently doubtful as to the con-
stitutional extent of this derivative power, in eras when the commerce clause
was being strictly construed by the courts,1 4 draftsmen of both the 1920 and
1935 Acts set forth indefinite distinctions between the extent of federal au-
thority on streams which themselves are arteries of interstate commerce, and
on those lesser waterways which are tributaries of navigable streams. 15
A number of utility companies have argued that the Commission has no
control over tributary rivers, except to secure the removal of impediments
to downstream transportation.'0  Until 1930, the FPC generally admitted
9. Popularly known as the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 49 STAT.
802, 15 U. S. C. §§ 79 et scq. (Supp. 1938). This section of the act is enforced by the
SEC. To some extent the powers of the SEC to simplify corporate structures and secure
geographical integration of holding company property conflict with the authority of the
FPC [49 STAT. 847 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 824 (b) (Supp. 1938)] to require unification of
operating facilities. See Plum, The Federal Power Act of 1935 (1938) 14 J. or LA'- &
P. U. EcoNT. 147 ct seq.
10. 49 STAT. 863, 16 U. S. C. § 791a (1938 Supp.).
11. 49 STAT. 847, 16 U. S. C. § 824 (1938 Supp.).
12. In Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 46 RL I. 496, 129 Ati.
495 (1925), aff'd, 273 U. S. 83 (1927), the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission vs
denied the right to regulate interstate rates, set by a generating plant within the state,
even though they directly affected local retail rates. See also Missouri v. Kansas Gas
Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1923). But see Pennsylvania Gas Co. Y. Public Serv. Comm., 252
U. S. 23 (1919). The legal obstacles to regulation of holding companies by state utility
commissions are outlined in RAusHENBUSH AND L.mLm, Powzn CONTnOL (1928) c. 5;
BAU R, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) c. 4.
13. 49 STAT. 844, 16 U. S. C. 807 (Supp. 1938).
14. Draftsmen of the 1920 Act were confronted with the decision in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), denying Congress the right to regulate the conditions
under which objects subsequently distributed in interstate commerce %%ere produced. For
contemporaneous discussion of the limited power to control stream conditions, exclusive
of navigation, see Starr, Navlgable Waters of the U. S.-State and Federal Control
(1921) 35 HARV. L. REv. 154. Draftsmen of the 1935 act were confronted with the
analogous decision, written only three months before, in Railroad Retire. Ed. v. Alton
R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), limiting federal control of railway workers' comlemation.
15. A detailed exposition of the statute's indefiniteness, concluding, however, that
federal substantive power was identical in controlling the tvwo types of streams, is con-
tained in Plum, supra note 9.
16. This contention is supported in LeBoeuf, State or Federal Control of the Water
Powers of Navigable Streams (1927) 15 GEo. L. J. 201; Shields, The Federal Power
Act (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 142.
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that its power was limited to this protection of the "minor federal interest." 17
But the replacement of the Commission of three cabinet members with a full
time independent agency in 193118 brought the enunciation of the present
doctrine that no project "affecting the interests of interstate commerce" can
be constructed until all conditions of the Power Act are met.
The refusal of some of the larger utility companies to accede to this new
administrative ruling stalemated the FPC's activities. Restrictive definition
of the "case or controversy" requirement enabled the Supreme Court to
negate the efforts of both parties to secure authoritative interpretation of
the Power Act.19 But after ten years of fruitless litigation, during which
time hydroelectric construction was curtailed, the Commission and one utility
firm seem finally to have succeeded in focusing their conflicting interests into
a justiciable controversy, involving the extent of federal authority over
power projects on the New River in Virginia.
The predecessor in title of the Appalachian Electric Power Co. first sought
a license for the construction of a power plant on the New River at Radford,
Virginia, in 1925. The company has always insisted that upon approval of
its dam plans, it was entitled to receive a "minor-part license," with exemp-
tion from all other provisions of the act, because of the limited federal interest
in tributary waterways. When the reconstituted commission declined to issue
the limited license, Appalachian Electric Power secured a permit from the
Virginia State Corporation Commission 20 and commenced work at Radford.
The FPC then sought to enjoin further construction.
17. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769, 776 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1939). The doctrine of minor interest was approved by Attorney-General Mitchell
in 1930, 36 Ops. ATry GEN. 355 (1930). In 1926, however, the Commission itself had
argued that it possessed plenary control over all streams affecting interstate commerce.
Plum, The Definition of Navigable Waters and the Doctrine of "Minor Interest" (1937)
13 J. OF LAND & P. U. EcoN. 398-400.
18. 46 STAT. 797 (1930), 16 U. S. C. § 792 (1934). The original Commission com-
prised the Secretaries of War, Agriculture, and Interior; the chief executive officer was
an independent secretary. The present Commission has five full-time members.
19. The Appalachian Co. filed suit against the individual members of the FPC in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in 1931 to restrain
the Commission from interfering with the construction of the Radford dam and to remove
a cloud from the title to its land. The original bill was dismissed on the grounds that
there was no present controversy between the parties to the suit. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6 (W. D. Va. 1931). It was subsequently dismissed in
the circuit court of appeals for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant commis-
sioners, who were residents of the District of Columbia. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v.
Smith, 67 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
In an essentially similar situation, the FPC sought to file an original bill in equity in
the Supreme Court, joining the state which had issued a license in derogation of the
federal claim to authority, with the private power company. The bill was dismissed,
United Stateys v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463 (1935), on the ground that the state had
asserted no right presently adverse to the federal claim of authority. Earlier, the attempt
of the State of New Jersey to secure definitive adjudication of the FPC's authority with-
in its borders was dismissed as an abstract quarrel between sovereignties. New Jersey
v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 (1926).
20. The Virginia license was obtained under VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) §§ 4065 (a),
4066. The Appalachian Company notified the Secretary of War, after beginning construe-
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On the theory that the case presented a question of "constitutional fact,""-
the district court, after ordering de novo review of the facts by a master's
hearing, dismissed the government's petition.22 The Fourth Circuit Court
affirmed, 23 agreeing that the New River was not a "navigable waterway of
the United States" and that the proposed dam would not interfere with the
flow of commerce on the admittedly navigable Kanawha or Ohio rivers,
below their confluence with the New. Certiorari2-4 was granted by the Su-
preme Court last March, and the cause was argued in October.
In terms of the 19th century juristic concept, originated to create federal
control of steamboat operation on inland waterways,2 5 that navigability at
law is synonymous with navigability in fact, the lower court decisions are
inescapable. The New River is a shallow stream, with a current of at least
three to five miles an hour flowing through a channel filled with rocks and
tion, that it was willing to abide by his regulations "relating to the putative protection of
navigation," promulgated under 41 STAT. 1070 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 804 (1934). Brief
for Appellee, pp. 11-12, in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 107 F. (2d)
769 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
21. Urging that the existence of federal authority was dependent on the navigability
of the New River, the district court [United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 23
F. Supp. 83, 115 (W. D. Va. 1938)] argued that de ,wvo review was necessary under
the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). But since the dispute between
the Commission and the utility company centered not about the determination of indi-
vidual facts, e.g., stream velocity, but about the legal conclusion as to the navigability
of the river, conducting master's hearings seems to serve no function other than that of
delaying the settlement of the controversy. See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson (1932)
80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1055, 1090. The District Court also conducted de nlov review to
determine the effect of the Radford project on downstream navigation, although this
seems to be the type of technical question specifically excluded from judicial review by
the Crowell case. See Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910)
(Court refused to review finding of the Secretary of War that the bridge impaired river
navigation; a "constitutional fact" argument wvas rejected).
22. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 23 F. Supp. 83 (NV. D. Va. 1938).
As a result of the overthrow of the "negative order" limitation, it is no longer necessary
for an aggrieved utility actually to commence construction work on its project in order to
secure adjudication of its rights. Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939).
Provided timely application for a re-hearing is made to the Commission, the order refus-
ing a minor part license is appealable to the circuit court of appeals. 49 STAT. 860 (1935),
16 U. S. C. § 8251(a) (b) (Supp. 1938).
23. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 4th,
1939) (Parker, C. J., dissenting).
24. Cert. granted, 309 U. S. 646 (1940) ; nwion of State of Virginia to intervene
denied_ with leave to file brief as amicus curiae, 309 U. S. 636 (1940). Presumably the
dismissal of the state intervention effort means that an attempt by the state to secure
adjudication of the FPC's authority in a specific situation would fail. See New Jersey
v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 (1926).
25. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall 557 (U. S. 1870). This definition is still used in cases
deciding title to river beds, United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64 (1931). Heedless of the
different practical problems involved in settling bed title disputes and in allocating con-
trol of rivers among governmental agencies, the circuit court of appeals freely cited the
Utah decision and other similar controversies in its decision in the instant case. United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769, 780 (1939).
1940] NOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rapids. Except for one thirty mile intra-state stretch,20 there is no present
commerce.
But following the enunciation of what may be called the "canoe theory
of jurisdiction" in the Economy Light and Power27 case, the courts have
built up a technical legal definition of a navigable river to include: (a) waters
which were arteries of commerce at any past date in American history;28
(b) streams for whose improvement appropriations have been made by
Congress ;29 or (c) streams which are potentially capable of serving as means
of transportation." The conclusive demonstration that the courts have created
an independent life for the legal concept of navigation, based on the necessity
of eliminating state-created barriers to national economic development, came
in Arizona v. California.31 Hoping to reap future benefit from preservation
of its status as sovereign riparian proprietor along an extensive stretch of
the Colorado River, Arizona objected to the construction of Boulder Dam
and the operation of a joint federal-state water diversion program.3 2 A simple
Congressional declaration that the shallow and rapid Colorado River was,
in fact, navigable was held to justify federal control regardless of unanimous
contrary testimony by regional hydrologic experts.
The United States' position could be sustained in the instant case by making
the Commission's determination of the condition of a river as conclusive as
the fiat of Congress. Alternatively, the Supreme Court might discard the
over-worked fiction of navigability and rest federal jurisdiction on a more
26. At Radford, Va., the intra-state river-borne commerce is transhipped into West
Virginia by railroad. This would seem to establish federal jurisdiction on the reasoning
of the Shreveport case, 230 U. S. 352, 432 (1913) (intra-state railway rates may be set
by the ICC, when necessary to protect the interests of interstate commerce). This inter-
pretation would not permit the broad expansion of FPC control over stream develop-
ment, which might result from the statutory interpretation suggested infra p. 139, and
would leave the extent of federal power control a question to be determined only as a
result of prolonged litigation.
27. 256 U. S. 113 (1921). The Desplaines River in Illinois had not been used in
commerce for a century; prior to the cessation of navigation, however, it had been used
for regular canoe and barge transportation for a century and a half, from 1670 to 1820.
In Water Power Co. v. Water Comm'rs, 168 U. S. 349, 359 (1895) a section of the
Mississippi River was declared navigable because it had been used for floating logs and
rafts. Contra: United States v. Rio Grande Irrig. Co., 174 U. S. 690, 699 (1899).
28. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113 (1921) ; see Ari-
zona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 453-4 (1931).
29. 41 STAT. 1063, 16 U. S. C. § 796(8) (1934). See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 328-30 (1936).
30. United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 80 (1936) ; Ne-Bo-Shone, Inc. v. Hogarth,
81 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U. S. 288, 329 (1936); Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606 (M. D.
Ala. 1922) ; United States v. Ladley, 4 F. Supp. 580 (D. Idaho 1933).
31. 283 U. S. 423 (1931). Article IV of the Colorado River compact, which had
been approved by Congress and was the general basis for the developmental program,
contains a flat declaration that the Colorado River was non-navigable. H. R. Doc. No.
605, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923) 10.
32. Griswell, Colorado River Conferences and their Implications (1930) 148 ANNALS,
Part 2, 12-19.
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realistic statutory basis. Section 23 of the present Act
33 requires projects
in non-traversable streams to be licensed, whenever the Commission finds
"that the interests of interstate or foreign commerce would be affected" by
such construction. Since periodic inundations on the New River swell the
flood tides on the Kanawha and Ohio,34 it is desirable that the upstream
reservoir be regulated. 33 Once the relationship of the Radford project to
downstream navigation is established, the statute confers plenary authority
on the FPC,30 with the Commission specifically directed to protect hydro-
electric development and to preserve all "beneficial public uses" of water.
37
Such a use of the statute requires, of course, a broad interpretation of the
commerce clause. But apparently past deficiencies of this constitutional power
have been eliminated by the recent Supreme Court construction of the clause.
Already the NLRB has been conceded jurisdiction over lab or practices in
generating plants, which supply power to manufacturers selling in a nation-
wide market.38 And the control of the marketing structure fur the sale of
electrical energy,39 either in interstate transactions or for local transmission
to large manufacturers, seems as reasonably related to the protection of inter-
state commerce as the already approved assignment of agricultural produc-
tion quotas or the determination of coal prices
40
Whether the legal technique used is invocation of the fiction of navigability
or the more realistic resort to a broadened interpretation of the commerce
power, it is desirable that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in
the instant case should be reversed and the FPC granted an injunction. For
behind the smoke screen of controversy over stream flow and bed declination
lie a number of vital economic issues. In the first place, there is the determina-
tion of the cost of eventual public acquisition of private utility plants. The
"recapture clause" of the Act, which creates the federal option to purchase
private power works fifty years after the grant of a license, eliminates good
will and going concern value from consideration in the formulation of the
purchase price. To reduce the cost of public ownership, the valuation base
is set by the statute at contemporaneous fair value or actual private construc-
33. 49 STAT. 846 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §817 (Supp. 1938).
34. HousE Doc. No. 91, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 69, 111, 118-9; Brief for
petitioner, pp. 108-111, United States v. Appalachian Elec. Powir Co., Supreme Court,
October Term 1939, No. 674 (hereinafter referred to as Brief for petitioner).
35. Brief for petitioner, pp. 92-88.
36. 49 STAT. 846 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 817 (Supp. 193S). The only statutory provi-
sion for a minor license is in connection with the construction of a power project, partly
on the public domain of the United States, and partly on private land. 49 STT. 847
(1935), 16 U. S. C. § 818 (Supp. 1938).
37. 49 STAT. 842 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 803(a) (Supp. 1938).
38. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
39. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419 (1938) (the decision is
concerned only with the right of Congress to compel utility holding companies to register
with the SEC; dicta indicate that the federal government may exercise wide control
over the marketing structure of the electrical utility industry).
40. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939) (agricultural production quotas) ; Sun-
shine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adldns, 310 U. S. 381 (1940) (determination of coal prices).
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tion expenditure, whichever is less.41 Furthermore, the statute provides that
excess profits, earned after the first twenty years of operation, must be accu-
mulated in an amortization reserve and subtracted from the estimation of
actual net investment.
42
A line of judicial decisions going back to Smyth v. Ames 43 in 1898, or-
dinarily makes the elimination of intangible items or of reproduction cost
new from a valuation base a violation of due process. But since the federal
government has the right to deny applicants the privilege of constructing
dams affecting the interest of interstate commerce,4 4 presumably it also has
the right to condition its approval of site permits. 45 The insertion of the
statutory valuation scheme as a condition of the site license establishes a con-
tractual relationship between the United States and its licensees. Once hav-
ing acceded voluntarily to the terms of the contract, an operating company,
or its successors in title,46 are estopped from later raising the issue of un-
constitutional conditions. This contractual by-pass around due process has
already been employed successfully by state and municipal regulatory agen-
cies 47 and should permit the Federal Government to acquire power plants,
originally built through its consent, without being forced through intermin-
able litigation 4 3 or made to pay an exorbitant sum for paper values. 40
41. 41 STAT. 1071 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 844 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 809 (Supp.
1938).
42. 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §803(d) (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 842
(1935), 16 U. S. C. § 803(d) (Supp. 1938).
43. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 546-7 (1898) ; Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston,
258 U. S. 388 (1922). But see Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 292
U. S. 290, 309 (1934). Most economists are convinced that the task of formulating an
objective rate basis by the "fair value of tangible and intangible factors" method pre-
sents instiperable difficulties and should be abandoned. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY (1939) 1090-8; Hale, "The Fair Value" Merry-Go-Round (1939) 33 ILL. L.
REV. 517, 520-7.
44. United States v. Rio Grande Irrig. Co., 174 U. S. 690 (1899) ; see Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 413 (1928).
45. See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 (1926). The state of Wisconsin was
conceded the right to include a recapture clause in a site license, for a power project on
a navigable stream in Fox River Co. v. Railroad Comm., 274 U. S. 651 (1927). In Bloom-
field Gravel Mining Co. v. United States, 88 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1898), Congress % as
held empowered to prohibit hydraulic mining above the navigable part of a stream, ex-
cept under conditions prescribed by a federal commission.
46. The FPC's permission is prerequisite to transfers of physical assets. 49 STAT.
847 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 824b (Supp. 1938).
47. States: Fox River Co. v. Railroad Comm., 274 U. S. 651 (1927); Municipali-
ties: Georgia Power Co. v. Citizens of Decatur, 281 U. S. 505 (1930) ; Columbus Ry. &
P. Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919); Collier, Public Utility Regulation (1933)
1 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 172.
48. See separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in St. Josephs Stockyard
Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 73 (1936) ; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in
McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419, 423 (1938) ; FRANKFURTER, TnE PUDLIC
AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930) c. 3.
49. The statute eliminates "franchise value" and "going concern value" from consid-
eration in the formulation of the public acquisition price. Both omissions seem ccononi-
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The second major issue, as indicated by the joint amicus brief filed by
thirty-nine states in support of the Appalachian Electric Power Co., is the
determination of whether the paramount authority over the production of
hydro-electric power shall rest in the hands of national or local agencies.
There is no dispute over direct rate regulation. Statutory prescriptions"'
and past court decisions 5' extend general control over local retail and whole-
sale rates to the state commissions and award exclusive authority over inter-
state transactions to the FPC. But the upholding of the United States' con-
tentions in the present case would presumably lead to eventual pre-emption
by national agencies of control over hydroelectric plant installations, amor-
tization reserves, and other details of operationY' Protests that such activities
would complicate the process of state regulation or violate the Tenth Amend-
ment ignore the realities of federal government. The Constitutional division
of authority over electricity rates forces federal and state agencies to run
partially over-lapping courses. It seems economically preferable to work
towards uniformity, by requiring local commissions to conform their control
of local operations to basic management regulation by the Federal Govern-
ment, rather than to force the agency regulating interstate transactions to
adjust its regulations to 48 diverse patterns.
Conceding the legitimacy of inserting recapture provisions in a site license,
the jurisdictional dispute also subsumes an alleged invasion of state pro-
prietary interests by the creation of a prior federal right to purchase private
power plants.53 But subordination of FPC eminent domain proceedings to
local control would mean the end of national supremacy and the substitution
of a system of "dual federalism." r1 It would permit state governments to
ically justifiable. Permitting the inclusion of a separate item for the value conferred on a
utility by the possession of a franchise permits the company to capitalize a public grant
against the public. See BAUER & GOLD, PUBLIc UTILITY VALUATION FMR PuMss O- RrMT
CONTROL (1934) 265. "Going concern value" is often defined as capitalized earning power.
See BAUER & GOLD, op. cit. mspra at 303-4; 2 KsaFR, ADVANCED AccoUNyMi (1933)
97. Since the equity capital of shareholders is returned and they have a chance to seek
profitable investment elsewhere, it seems over-generous to pay them the profit they might
have earned, if their old investment had not been liquidated. See Roberts v. New York
City, 295 U. S. 264, 284-5 (1935) (franchise and going concern values can be eliminated
or reduced by a state court in condemnation proceedings, without violation of due pro-
cess).
50. 41 STAT. 1073 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §813 (1934). The FPC is empowered to
appoint boards of representatives from state commissions to deal with interstate prob-
lems, and may also conduct joint hearings with these commissions. 49 STAT. 853 (1935),
16 U. S. C. § 824h(a) (b) (Supp. 1938).
51. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm.. .73 U. S. q (1927).
52. The FPC has conducted joint bearings with state commissions in dealing with a
number of these problems and has sought in other ways to cooperate with the local ad-
ministrators rather than to supersede them. 19 Px.P. FPC (1939) 9, 18-19; FPC Press
Release No. 107, July 30, 1936. But see Plum, A Critique of the Federal Powcr Act
(1938) 14 J. OF LAND A D P. U. Eco,. 147, 154-161.
53. See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia, as Amnicus Curiae, pp. tS-70, United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., Supreme Court, October Term, 1940, No. 12.
54. ComvN, TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME CouR (1934) 156.
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protect their parochial economic interests at the expense of unified develop-
ment of national energy resources.55 The decision in Arizona v. California0
established the right of the United States, as superior sovereign, to condemn
land contiguous to a navigable stream, whether or not local officials approved
the acquisition. The same power would seem to exist in the case of a tribu-
tary waterway, over which Congress has authority.
The third major issue lying behind the instant case is the determination
of the extent of the authority of the FPC to enforce unified development of
all water facilities in an interstate river basin. Individual self-interest often
results in the operation of specific plants so as to interfere with other pro-
jects. 57 An example is provided on the New River. Unless the maintenance
of reservoir levels and the release of water from the Radford power dam
are subject to control by the Government flood engineers, the effect of the
elaborate system of downstream retarding reservoirs in lowering flood tides
throughout the Ohio and Mississippi valleys may be nullified. 8
The wild and de-populated nature of the New River Valley makes any
larger scale affirmative planning highly improbable in this specific situation.
But if the Commission is granted the right to insert conditions in the site
license, beyond limitations necessary in the interests of navigation, then it
will be able to require utility concerns on other rivers to cease disposing
of dangerous industrial waste in the stream,5 9 to compensate for cutting down
protective timber,60 to preserve adequate supplies of potable water for near-by
municipalities, or to provide recreational facilities. 61
55. See note 32 supra. KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER POWER LEGISLATION (1926) 281-5;
see Editorial, ELECTRICAL RECORD, April, 1923, p. 201.
56. 283 U. S. 423 (1931). See Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875); Alabama
Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606 (M. D. Ala., 1922).
57. Fly, The Federal Government and Water Resources (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 274, 287-9; NATIONAL RESOURCES BOARD REPoar (1934) 263-4; Clemens, The Rcser-
voir as a Flood Control Structure (1935) 100 TRANS. OF Am. Soc. OF CiV. ENG. 879,
905-909.
58. H. R. Doc No. 91, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 69, 111, 118-119. Brief for Peti-
tioner, pp. 106-111. See 5 REP. TVA (1938) 14-17; 6 REP. TVA (1939) 2, 8.
59. Water pollution impairs the health of riparian dwellers, reduces aquatic life,
causing loss to important industries, renders water unfit for recreational or drinking
purposes, and shortens the life of bridges. Incautious disposal of industrial waste in
navigable streams is an important cause of pollution. NAT'L RES. COMM., WATER POL-
LUTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1939) 13-45. Early River and Harbor Acts contain gen-
eral interdictions against the disposal of industrial waste in streams under the federal
jurisdiction, 22 STAT. 209 (1888) ; 35 STAT. 623 (1909). These acts are widely violated,
however, and effective new enforcement machinery is urgently needed. NAT. RES. Comm.,
op. cit. supra at 82-4, 85.
60. The importance of timber or grass coverage to the regularization of water flow
and therefore to flood control and the prevention of land-gully formation and sheet ero-
sion on cultivated land is indicated in TVA, SOIL (1935) and in TVA, LIrm WATERs
(1935).
61. See the discussion of the integration of recreation project construction with gen-




In the past, pre-emption of the few centralized sites on the headwaters of
navigable streams by power companies often retarded the development of
other water facilities. 62 But if multi-purpose projects are constructed, in the
first instance, it becomes possible to retain private utility ownership and yet
secure many of the benefits of regional planning.03 Distribution of the general
overhead burden among a variety of projects, although presenting a com-
plicated accounting problem, 4 tends to reduce the cost of unit service and
thus permits rural communities to enjoy some of the amenities of urban
centers.
65
Admittedly the Federal Power Commission, beset by litigation g and ham-
pered by lack of funds, 7 has as yet shown little interest in this type of water
development. Long range programs have already been tentatively outlined
by the National Resources Committee 9 and the Mississippi Valley Com-
mittee,70 and the support of state planning agencies has been enlisted. A
broad decision in the instant case cannot compel federal action. But, by
ignoring procedural by-passes,7 1 which would leave the authority of the FPC
still shrouded in doubt, the Supreme Court can place the responsibility for
further delay squarely upon the administrative officers of the government.
62. 3 REP. N. Y. STATE PLAN. Comm. (1938) 44-47; 4 REP. N. Y. ST.ATZ PLA..
Comm. (1939) 53-55; Fly, The Federal Govermnment and Water Rcsources (1938) 85
U. OF PA. L. REv. 264, 288.
63. NAT. REs. Comm., DRAINAGE BAsIN PROBLEMS AND PROG-R0S (1938) 1-11.
See McDougal & Runyon, Book Review (1940) 49 Ym. L. J. 1502, 1505-7.
64. See CL.An, EcoNomics OF OVEF_RAD COSTS (1926) 35-70, 135-149.
65. MumFoRD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1938) 300-392, discusses many uf the eco-
nomic problems involved.
66. 19 REP. FPC (1939) 30-33.
67. Hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R.
8141, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 8-11.
68. Examination of the file of permits and licenses issued in the past year reveals the
insertion of numerous conditions in individual site licenses, designed to protect concur-
rent uses of water. 19 RE. FPC (1939) 46-61.
69. NAT. RES. Comm., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLEMtS AND PRoGRAMS (1938) 6-126;
NAT. RE s. Comm., ENERGY RESOURCES AND NATIONAL, POLICY (1939) 263-8, -74-81.
70. FED. EYERG. ADM. OF PUBLIC WoRRS, REPORT OF THE 'ISSISSIPPI VALLEY COM-
miTTn (1934).
71. Among the by-passes the Supreme Court may choose to follow are: (a) send-
ing the case back to the District Court, 49 STAT. 861 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 825m (a)
(Supp. 1938), for review pursuant to the "substantial evidence" rule, 49 STAT. 860 (1935),
16 U. S. C. § 8251(b) (Supp. 1938); (b) deciding that the New River, on the facts
adduced in the instant case, is navigable at law, and not in any way discussing the extent
of FPC jurisdiction over tributary streams; (c) upholding federal jurisdiction because
of the small volume of intra-state river commerce connected with interstate railway lines.
See note 26 supra.
Solutions (b) and (c) supra would leave the extent of FPC authority uncertain
and tend to retard integrated development of vater resources, pending further litigation.
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ALLOWANCE OF INTEREST DURING REORGANIZATION
PROCEEDINGS
As a matter of administrative convenience in both bankruptcy' and equity
receivership 2 cases, the courts early adopted the rule that, after the debtor's
estate had passed into the custody of the court, interest would not be allowed
among creditors of the same class when insufficient assets were thought to
make the allowance an idle gesture. The rule governed the ratable distribu-
tion of assets among creditors of the same class ;3 it did not operate to deny
interest to the secured creditor if the proceeds of his security permitted,
4
or to deny interest to any creditor if a surplus would otherwise be returned
to the debtor.5 Among creditors of the same class, the rule was thought
to work no injustice if their claims bore interest at different rates, because
the law's delays would otherwise benefit the creditor who had contracted for
the higher rate, while if all bore interest at the same rate, computing interest
would not change the shares in distribution.6 A question inevitably raised
*In re Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., D. Minn., Aug. 14, 1940.
1. Ex parte Bennett, 2 Atk. 541 (Ch. 1743).
2. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893) ; American Iron & Steel Mfg.
Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261 (1914). The rule is carried over into
statutory schemes for bank liquidation. Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173
U. S. 131 (1899) ; cf. Ticonic Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 303 U. S. 406 (1938). For general
discussions of the rule see Hanson, Effect of Insolvency Proceedings opt Creditor's Right
to Interest (1934) 32 MIcH. L. REV. 1069; Clark, Contingent and Imnnaturc Claims in
Receivership Proceedings (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 481, 486.
3. Bromley v. Goodere, 1 Atk. 90 (Ch. 1743).
4. Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 245 (1909) ; Spring Coal Co. v. Keech, 239 Fed.
48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916). Where a property is subject to two liens, interest will run
on the superior. First Nat. Bank v. Ewing, 103 Fed. 168 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900) ; Richmond
& I. Const. Co. v. Richmond, N. I. & B. Ry., 68 Fed. 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895); Central
Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895). But cf. Thomas v. Western Car
Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893). Although a first mortgagee can exclude a second mortgagee
from a reorganization if the property is worth less than the first mortgage debt, In re
620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U. S. 24 (1936); In re Witherbee Court Corp., 88 F.
(2d) 251 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), this result has not been tested where the exclusion results
from subsequent accrual of interest on the first mortgage.
5. Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed. 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911); Bromley v. Goodere,
1 Atk. 90 (Ch. 1743). The rule has been characterized as "a necessary rule of distribu-
tion" carrying no intimation that the claims of creditors had lost their "interest-bearing
character." American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261
(1914). Language in the opinion loosely favors the running of interest on claims of
the "highest dignity." But, in general, preferred claims not secured by lien are not
granted interest unless the principal of all claims is paid in full. Fordyce v. Kansas City
& N. C. Ry. Co., 145 Fed. 566 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1906); Boston & A. B. Co. v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co., 82 Md. 535, 34 Atl. 778 (1896); Note (1930) 69 A. L. R. 1210; cf.
Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). But cf. Powell v. Link, 114 F.
(2d) 550 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). Tax claims are a recognized exception. See United
States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304 (1924). "Penalties" as distinguished from "interest"
may be a further basis for exception. In re Semon, 11 F. Supp. 18 (D. C. Conn. 1935).
6. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261 (1914).
Another explanation - that the debtor should not pay interest during a period in which
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is whether the non-allowance rule is applicable to a Chapter X reorganization
of a continuing corporate enterprise.
The non-allowance rule is embodied in Section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act,
which provides that claims absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the
petition are provable "with any interest thereon which would have been re-
coverable at that date . . ." The general opinion, rendered in other con-
texts, that Section 63a was expressly excluded from application to reorgan-
izations under Section 773 by subdivision (k) of that section8 might suggest
that the non-allowance rule was thereby excluded, were it not for subdivision
(o), which provided that the rights and liabilities of creditors should be the
same as if a voluntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed and an adjudica-
tion entered on the day of the approval of the petition. Moreover, the clause
of Section 77B excluding Section 63a was not repeated in 77B's successor,
Chapter X. The applicability of the rule may hinge on an interpretation of
Section 102 of Chapter X, under which provisions of Chapters I to VII,
including the statutory embodiment of the rule in 63a, are made applicable
to Chapter X only "insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with
the provisions" of Chapter X.9
So long as participation of claimants in reorganizations under the bank-
ruptcy acts was determined by bargain rather than by judicial standards
of strict priority, both the statutory niceties and a consideration of the concepts
underlying them were neglected. But the Supreme Court's recent reaffirma-
tion of the principle of strict priority,'0 and the presence of expert admin-
istrative boards to inspect the legality of reorganization plans, have focused
attention upon the amount of the claim entitled to priority. The importance
of interest among creditors' contract rights, however, has not been uniformly
stressed" even by the astute Securities and Exchange Commission,12 which
he has been deprived of the use of his property-is not persuasive in reorganization.
Tredegar Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 183 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910).
7. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended by 48 STAT. 923 (1934), 48 ST, T. 991 (1934)
and 49 STAT. 1475 (1936) ; 11 U. S. C. § 103 (1939 Supp.).
. Subdivision (k) made § 63 inapplicable to proceedings under § 77B unless an
order was entered directing the trustee to liquidate the estate. 48 ST.T. 912 (1934),
11 U. S. C. § 207 (1937 Supp.). See In re James Butler Grocery Co., 12 F. Supp. 851
(E. D. N. Y. 1935) ; 2 GamEs, CORPOaATE REoRGANizATiois (1936) 972.
9. Section 102, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 502 (1939 Supp.).
10. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 308 U. S. 106 (1939), (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 1099; Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumbcr Products Company Case and its
Implications (1940) 53 HAnv. L. REv. 713; SEC REPoRT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTMA-
TION OF THE Wop.x, AcTriVTEs, PERSONNEL, AND FuNcrioNs OF PrTLT-rE AN;D Wrt-
GANiZATioN ComniTEs, Pt. VIII (1940) 142-161.
11. In the first reorganization reported on by the SEC under the Chandler Act,
interest accrued only to the filing of the petition was used in computing the mortgage
debt; the plan was disapproved on other grounds. In re Penn Timber Co., SEC Corp.
Reorg. Release No. 8, March 17, 1939, SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 24, May 1, 1940.
See also 12 re Detroit Int. Bridge Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 9, March 24,
1939, p. 5; In re National Radiator Corp., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 10, March 25,
1939; cf. Inland Power & Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 2042,
May 2, 1940. Interest accrued on bonds during receivership, not provided for in the plan,
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in using its powers under the Chandler Act' 3 and the Public Utility Holding
Company Act to develop objective standards of fairness for reorganizations
has been watchful of those rights. But in its recent report on the Minnesota
Paper reorganization,'14 the Commission flatly took the position that the non-
allowance rule is inapplicable to proceedings under Chapter X.
In 1931 the Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. entered an equity receivership
proceeding in the federal district court, which continued until the corpora-
tion filed its petition under 77B in 1934. The judge issued an order making
appropriate provisions of Chapter X applicable to the proceedings, and giving
the SEC leave under Section 20815 to appear as a party and report on the
fairness of the plans proposed. All of the plans excluded the stockholders.
The trustees' plans provided for accrual of interest on both secured and un-
secured claims from the filing of the 1931 petition to the effective date of the
plans. This increased the claim of the secured creditors from $24,925,000 to
$37,088,000, and of the unsecured creditors from $11,772,000 to $18,550,120.
The unsecured creditors proposed that the secured creditors should get accrued
interest only until the lien assets were exhausted.1 Under the SEC valuation
of $25,594,059, of which $20,740,146 was subject to the first mortgage lien,
was used by the SEC to demonstrate that common stockholders had no equity in In re
Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 13, June 16, 1939. A turning
point seems to have been reached in the LaFrance Industries case, where the bondholders
were to receive securities of the face value of their principal claim and half their claim
for interest accrued to the effective date of the plan, receiving a 15% common stock
equity for the other half. The SEC position was that the "minimum standard of fair-
ness" required that the stock equity have a value equal to the accrued interest sacrificed.
SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16, Sept. 1, 1939, p. 16. Accrued interest has been con-
sidered in determining fairness in later reports. Flour Mills of America, Inc., SEC Corp.
Reorg. Release No. 22, April 11, 1940; SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 30, July 15, 1940;
Deep Rock Oil Corp., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 23, April 29, 1940. It is proper
to point out that, since the Commission does not originate plans, its disapproval of one
feature of a plan does not imply that it does not also disapprove of the treatment of
interest. This may explain the earlier cases above.
12. In passing on § 77 plans, the ICC has taken the position that the Boyd case
requires extension of the secured creditors' priority to interest to all assets of the debtor,
so that if their value is less than the principal plus accrued interest on secured obliga-
tions, the unsecured creditors will have no participation: Spokane Int. Ry. Reorg., 228
I.C.C. 387, 402 (1938) ; Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Re6rg., 233 I.C.C. 515, 573 (1939);
Missouri Pac. R. R. Reorg., 239 I.C.C. 7, 116 (1940). If this doctrine were applied in
the Minnesota & Ontario case under the SEC valuation, no problem over "free assets"
would have arisen.
13. Section 172, 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §572 (Supp. 1939). A report by
the SEC is mandatory if the indebtedness of the debtor exceeds $3,000,000; if less, it is
optional with the court.
14. In re Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., D. Minn., Aug. 14, 1940; SEC Corp.
Reorg. Release No. 29, July 9, 1940, SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 33, Aug. 1, 1940.
15. Section 208, 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 608 (Supp. 1939). Intervention
under this section makes the SEC a party in interest but gives it no right to appeal.
16. As they were entitled to do regardless of the non-accrual rule. Spring Coal Co.
v. Keech, 239 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916). As a corollary, the unsecured creditors asked
no interest on their own claims.
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accrual raised the bondholders' share in the $4,853,913 free assets from a
fifth to almost half, with a consequent diversion from the unsecured creditors.
In approving the trustees' amended plan, the SEC submitted to the court
a memorandum 17 supporting the allowance of interest among unsecured
claimants.' 8 Its argument was based on the postulate of the equity cases:
that these claims, including not only those of unsecured creditors but those
of secured creditors claiming for a deficiency beyond the value of their secur-
ity, never lost their interest bearing character.
Interest was denied in the bankruptcy and equity cases, the Commission
-contended, solely as a convenient aid to liquidation."0 Liquidation is, of course,
the purpose of a straight bankruptcy. Though the equity receivership was
used as a rehabilitating device, procedurally it was a liquidation. The sale
took place outside the court, and the parties received new securities not from
the court but from the purchaser. The purpose of a corporate reorganization,
on the other hand, is to "avoid a winding up, a sale of assets, and a distribu-
tion of proceeds."' 20 The court keeps the business going until it is turned
over to a reorganized company. 21 Though the business is under judicial
control, to prevent its dissipation by the enforcement of liens, it does not
die on the day the petition is filed but lives on until its successor appears.
As of that date its assets are valued and only on that date, the Commission
concluded, should its contract liabilities be terminated.
Whatever may be thought of the Commission's distinction between reor-
ganization via equity receivership and statutory reorganization, which have
in common the "fixed principle" enunciated in the Boyd case,22 its analysis
is persuasive. The emphasis placed by the Commission on purely contractual
relationships, 23 however, may raise doubts as to the propriety and practicability
17. SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 33, Aug. 1, 1940.
18. The SEC approved the eventual distribution of securities under the trustees'
amended plan as fair, but used a valuation figure different from that of the trustees.
The district court did not hear argument on or decide the interest point and, in its
order approving the plan as fair and equitable, explicitly disavowed both valuations and
adopted none of its own. Obviously any discussion of the bearing of interest accrual
on the fairness of the plan might have proceeded in vaco unless the court had adopted
a valuation figure less than the principal of the secured claims.
19. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261, 265
(1914). It should be noted that in the principal case the SEC contended that interest
accrued not only during the 77B-Chapter X proceedings but during the preceding equity
receivership, the Commission's theory being that an equity receivership displaced by a
77B proceeding is not a distribution. The Commission relied upon a case which held
that interest accrued during a prior equity receivership is part of the debt for the pur-
pose of determining the solvency of the debtor in subsequent 77B proceedings. It: re
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 12 F. Supp. 528 (NV. D. N. Y. 1935).
20. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 433, 43S (1937).
21. This was always recognized in railroad insolvencies. See it re Chicago, M. St. P.
& P. Ry., 27 F. Supp. 685, 687 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
22. See note 10 supra.
23. "We submit that while the business continues as a living enterprise, substantial
justice can be worked only by a rule which continues the contract rights of the parties
so far as possible as they existed before the enterprise came under judicial control;
that is, by the accrual of interest on the debts until the cut-off date under the plan,"
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of a contractual approach. It may be argued that the Supreme Court is less
solicitous of contract rights in reorganization than the Commission. The
Court has sanctioned such interferences with contract as the suspension of
the pledgee's power of sale 24 and the limitation of the landlord's right to
future rent.2 5 Its theory is that such rights, which would be regarded as
substantive as against a solvent debtor, are mere "remedies" where a debtor
in reorganization is involved. This rationalization, subordinating contract
rights to the convenience of insolvency administration, is reminiscent of its
earlier theory that the interest-bearing character of claims may give way to
a rule of convenience in distribution.
Even if proper, however, the contractual approach raises practical problems
of fairness. Whether interest accrues against the debtor's estate is a question
of administration for the bankruptcy or receivership court the character and
amount of interest accruing on a particular claim are, however, matters of
local law.26  A strictly contractual approach might produce the undesirable
result of denying interest to creditors who, like the supplier in the American
Iron & Steel case, have not reserved interest by contract. Such a creditor
-unless as a creditor on unliquidated open account he was entitled to no
interest at all-generally would be entitled to interest as damages for the
detention of a debt.27 Even if the creditor reserves interest by contract, under
the New York rule his contract rights are said to be terminated by insolvency
and the contract rates thereafter are displaced by the legal rate.2 8 The Court
SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 33, Aug. 1, 1940, p. 8; see also Address of Abe Fortas,
Former Assistant Director of Public Utilities Division, SEC (July 14, 1938) 6.
24. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294
U. S. 648 (1935); Howland, Tile Enforcement of Secured Creditors' Claims nder 77
and 77b: A Functional Analysis (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1109. The Court expressed its
opinion that the injunction affected only the "remedy," comparing it with an injunction
issued by an ordinary bankruptcy court against the sale of real estate upon foreclosure.
Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 321 (1931). The right of a trustee under an indenture
to accelerate maturity on insolvency has, however, been termed substantive. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Henwood, 86 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 661
(1937).
25. In dismissing a landlord's objection to the limitation of provable future rent
claims under 77B to three years, the Court emphasized the remedial rather than the
substantive aspect of the right. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 452 (1937).
The three-year limitation is embodied in the Chandler Act. §202, 52 STAT. 893 (1938),
11 U. S. C. §602 (Supp. 1939).
26. This was assumed by the Court in American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261 (1914). Even where there is no local statute on interest,
the same result should be reached under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
27. Interest is not allowed on open accounts so long as they remain unliquidated.
South Carolina v. Port Royal & A. Ry., 89 Fed. 565 (C. C. S. C. 1898). On interest
generally, see Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914). The American rule
generally regards interest as an incident of the debt, while the English tendency is to
view it as a distinct contract right. SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 562. If the
right is interpreted as one of quasi-contract rather than damages, the SEC's contractual
approach should cause no difficulty.
28. People v. Merchants' Trust Co., 187 N. Y. 293, 79 N. E. 1004 (1907). The




in the American Iron & Steel case granted interest at the legal rate without
narrowly examining its contract basis. Probably the SEC, in advocating the
accrual of interest in the name of contract rights, does not envisage the
exclusion of creditors whose interest claims under local law are not strictly
contractual. 29 And where the local laws themselves are designed for con-
venience there seems no reason to exclude creditors or to deprive them of
the legal rate.
Unsecured creditors in the Minnesota Paper case objected to the SEC view
that interest accrued on the ground that allowance of interest among un-
secured claimants may markedly alter the relative participation of secured
and unsecured creditors. Though the rule of proof and participation for
secured creditors differed under the bankruptcy and equity rules, under neither
could the secured creditor's measure of participation in free assets be increased
by subsequent interest.30 In reorganization under the SEC rule, however,
the secured creditor's deficiency claim, consisting in whole or in part of
accrued interest, will entitle him to an increasing participation in free assets.
The extreme view, adopted by the ICC under Section 77, is that the secured
creditors are preferred against all assets necessary to compensate them for
their claims to principal and interest.31 If the ICC view were followed, the
unsecured creditors in the Minnesota Paper case would be excluded from
the reorganization. The SEC rule is milder: it continues their participation
in assets outside the lien, but makes them compete with the interest claims
of secured creditors, allowing them in the name of equality to accumulate
their own interest claims as well.
Though the bankruptcy and equity treatment of the secured creditor may
be appropriate if the security he holds will be preserved undepreciated and
undepleted during the lengthy reorganization period, it seems less appro-
priate when the secured creditor's security consists of a mortgage upon the
operating assets of a going enterprise. The real purpose of the security is
to assure the creditor priority in the dissolution or reorganization of the enter-
prise. Measuring the extent of such priority merely by a judicial valuation
of the assets under the lien may work injustice to the secured creditor. As
29. A cognate problem in reorganization may be presented by the contract right
of the preferred stockholder to accrued dividends. Cf. Community Power & Light Co.,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1803, Nov. 27, 1939.
30. The effect of the different rules was illustrated in the brief of the unsecured
creditors. Brief of the Unsecured Creditors, Appendix A, pp. 20, 21. Assume secured
debt and prior interest of $100 and $10 of subsequent interest, unsecured debt and interest
in the same amounts, $50 collateral and $60 in free assets. Under the bankruptcy rule
the secured creditor would claim against free assets for his $50 deficiency and the un-
secured creditor for $100, the secured creditor receiving in all $70 and the unsecured
creditor $40. Under the equity rule both would prove against free assets for $100, making
their respective shares $S0 and $30. Applying the bankruptcy rule of proof applicable
in corporate reorganization, and the SEC rule on accrual, both would have claims of
$110; the secured creditor would have a deficiency claim of $60, receiving in all $71 plus,
and the unsecured creditor would receive $38 plus. Changing the value of the security
or the relative amount of the principal claims of course makes the mathematical possi-
bilities endless.
31. See note 12 supra.
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the SEC points out, if the secured creditor has a mortgage on timber land
and the business of the debtor is cutting down trees, every day of operation
in reorganization or out shrinks the value of the "lien assets" and increases
the value of "free assets." 3 2  Even if the "lien assets" are more durable,
operation will tend to dissipate them if the debtor is operating only on an
out-of-pocket basis without a sound depreciation policy and consequently
lacks resources to maintain his competitive position in his own industry. 3
Such economic considerations must, in the SEC view, be given weight in
determining the fairness of the amount and grade of securities allotted to
the senior creditors in the new enterprise.3 4 By allowing interest on secured
claims during the reorganization without regard to the supposed valuation
of the lien assets, the mathematical relations of creditors among themselves
at the time of the appearance of the new enterprise are more fairly portrayed.
When there are no deficiency claims of secured creditors to compete with
the unsecured claims, interest accrual will operate only to vary the relative
participations of unsecured claimants in the reorganization. Even though a
cutoff date is a practical necessity, the procedure suggested in the Minnesota
Paper case shows that it is no less convenient to set this date at the begin-
ning of the new enterprise than at the filing of the petition. Apart from con-
venience, however, is the feeling that the rule may be "necessary" to prevent
a creditor gaining by the law's delays, as he would at the expense of claims
bearing a lower rate.3 5 Though the accumulation of interest at different rates
has been a spectre of insolvency administration, perhaps reflecting the prej-
udices of a period when interest was less common,30 it is difficult to under-
stand why, if interest runs at different rates during solvency among creditors
of the same class, their inequalities should not persist during insolvency.
Such inequalities are presumably bargained for, and the lower rates com-
pensated for by other advantages. It is true that if the legal rate is appre-
ciably higher than the prevailing contract rate, creditors who have contracted
32. In the principal case, over $1,000,000 worth of timber subject to the mortgage
lien was cut and sold during the reorganization, the proceeds becoming free assets. Tile
bondholders were denied a credit because under Minnesota law the mortgage is a security
only, legal title for purposes of sale remaining in the mortgagor. See SEC Corp. Reorg.
Release No. 29, July 9, 1940, p. 67, n. 217. But if the mortgagor's exploitation of timber
and other natural resources unreasonably impairs the security, the mortgagee's usual
remedy is injunction. See Notes (1935) 95 A. L. R. 957, (1928) 57 A. L. R. 451.
33. See SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 33, Aug. 1, 1940, p. 8.
34. The economic background of reorganization has been illuminated by the SEC
through its adoption of the earnings capitalization formula of valuation; see La France
Industries, SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16, Sept. 1, 1939. The relation between
the economic advisability and the legal reasons for reorganization, important in forming
any general policy toward secured creditors, is largely unexplored. See STUnGES, CASES
oN DEBTORS' ESTATES (3d ed., Poteat and Rostow, 1940) 1-6; Rostow and Cutler, Con-
peting Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act
(1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334.
35. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U. S. 261 (1914).
36. For a discussion of the effect of these prejudices on interest claims see Moore
and Shamos, Interest on Checking Accounts (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rav. 633, 637.
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for interest may suffer, unless local law also awards them the legal rate.Y
On the other hand, this consideration may be balanced by the fact that creditors
who failed to contract for interest did not contemplate deferred payment, and
may legitimately be preferred over those who lent money to the debtor as an
investment.
It may well be that the arguments for applying the rule against allowance
of interest are ill-founded even in the simple liquidating procedures. But
though they may persist in that arena, the SEC's conclusion that the rule
has no place in proceedings under Chapter X seems inescapable. Convenience
in administration of Chapter X proceedings does not require the rule, and
its chief effect in practice would appear to be to introduce uncertainty in the
determination of claimants' rights in the reorganization.3 s
INCOME AND GIFT TAX AVOIDANCE BY DEDUCTIONS FOR
INTEREST ON PROMISSORY NOTES*
SINCE tax law usually ignores the economic unity of the family and assumes
the husband and wife to be legally separate entities dealing at arm's length,
it is not surprising that transactions between members of the family are a
fertile source of tax avoidance.' The husband, who normally receives the
larger income, cannot deduct family expenses,2 which frequently exceed the
exemption 3 allowed a married man. The tax problem he faces has, therefore,
two aspects: first, by what devices can he take his income out of the higher
brackets where it is subject to steep surtaxes; and, second, how can he
reduce his own income without materially changing the combined income
of husband and wife as it previously existed? If this reallocation can be
arranged, the husband has furnished a source of income to his wife, whom
he ordinarily supports, and the result, in effect, is to raise the exemption to
approximate his living expenses.
37. As under the New York rule. See note 28 supra.
38. Although unsecured creditors even under the rule are entitled to interest if the
debtor is solvent, the fact that the debtor's solvency in the bankruptcy sense may be
undetermined at the time their claims are filed has possibly led them to sleep on their
rights. No other reason for the absence of litigation by unsecured creditors, or the
failure to claim interest in promulgated plans, suggests itself.
* William Park v. Comm'r, 113 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), aff'g William Park,
38 B. T. A. 1118 (1938).
1. See Bruton, Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YAL L. J. 1172; Paul and
Havens, Husband and Wife under the Income Tax (1936) 5 Bno m-.,:x L rLv. 241;
Reiling, Taxing the Income of Husband and lWife (1935) 13 Tax .MA. 198; Rudic:,
The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance (1940) 7 L-w & Co:T'rmxi,. P:oB.
243; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1279. But see Helvering v. Clifford, 369 U. S. 331,
at 336-7 (1940), 49 YALE L. J. 1305.
2. INr. REv. CODE §24(a)(1) (1939).
3. $2,500. See INT. REv. CODE §25(b)(1), (2) (1939).
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One such method of tax avoidance has recently received judicial sanction
in William Park v. Commissioner.4 A resident of Pennsylvania, in 1923,
gave his wife as an absolute gift a sealed demand note of $150,000 at 6%
interest. In Pennsylvania, a note under seal is legally enforceable without
consideration.5 In addition, the note was secured by collateral valued in excess
of its face amount. For eleven years no demand for payment was made,
and during that time the wife annually received $9,000 in interest which she
reported as income. The husband annually deducted the interest from his
gross income. The Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the husband's deduc-
tion, asserting that the payments were "interest paid or accrued on indebt-
edness" as set forth in what is now Section 23(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code.6 The majority of the court reasoned that since the sealed note was
enforceable according to state law, 7 the transaction conformed to the common
definition of "indebtedness." And the annual payments were "interest" because
they were the price of the wife's forbearance to demand payment of the
principal. Further, the majority did not believe it was a colorable device as
they found no intent to avoid taxes.
Confronted with a lack of statutory definition of the two key words, the
court was in a position to exercise some discretion in construing the statute.
Although enforceability is a common 8 and acceptable test of "indebtedness," 9
recognition of the seal in this regard means that the effectiveness of federal
taxation is made partially dependent on state law. 10 Although states can, of
course, create legal rights, the Federal Revenue Acts and the courts have
the power to designate what rights are taxable." Freedom to define judicially
the content of "indebtedness" has been plainly exemplified in a holding that a
promise must be unconditional to obtain a deduction.'2 Furthermore, one
4. 113 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), aft'g William Park, 38 B. T. A. 1118
(1938).
5. Yard v. Patton, 13 Pa. 278 (1850) ; Balliet v. Fetter, 314 Pa. 284, 171 AtI. 466
(1934) ; Fritz' Estate, 135 Pa. Super. 463, 5 Atl. (2d) 601 (1939) ; RESTATEMrENT, CON-
TRACTS, PA. ANNO. (1933) § 110. Pennsylvania is the only state with the Uniforih Writ-
ten Obligations Act; thus a promise without seal, or consideration, or estoppel, may
nevertheless be valid.
6. Section 23(b) of the Revenue Acts of 1932 and 1934 were in question in the
instant case. The relevant wording is now repeated in INT. REv. CODE § 23(b) (1939).
7. See note 5 supra.
8. Popular meaning of words controls construction. See Old Colony Ry. v. Comm'r,
284 U. S. 552, 560 (1932) ; Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251, 261 (U. S. 1853); Do
Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376, 381 (1919).
9. Gilman v. Comm'r, 53 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), (1932) 80 A. L. R. 214;
Comm'r v. Tennessee Co., 111 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) ; Harry Lee Martin, 33
B. T. A. 340 (1935); Simon Benson, 9 B. T. A. 279 (1927); City of Perry v. Johnson,
106 Okla. 32, 233 P. 679 (1925).
10. Federal tax inequalities also arise where states recognize property in entirety
and community property. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930); Note (1939) 17
TAX MAG. 482. See also note 1 supra.
11. See Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U. S. 78, 80 (1940); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S.
188, 193 (1938) ; Burnet v. Hormel, 287 U. S. 103, 110 (1932).
12. Gilman v. Comm'r, 53 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
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might question the majority's interpretation of the annual payments as
"interest," since in orthodox usage 13 the word refers to the charge for using
the lender's money or property. Inasmuch as the note was a gift, the donor
was not using the money or property of the donee except in the rather un-
common sense that the donee refrained from demanding the principal.
As there are still fifteen states' 4 in which a sealed contract is generally
enforceable without consideration, the scope of the device thus sanctioned
cannot be summarily dismissed. Conflict of laws doctrine may even extend
its influence to residents of other states.15 However, before attempting to
use a sealed contract in this manner in states where it may be enforced, two
complications should be considered. One is that the validity of the sealed
instrument may be affected by its negotiability. The Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law' 6 seeks to destroy the conclusive presumption of considera-
tion which the seal exercised at common law;17 yet where the problem of
the negotiable sealed note has arisen, courts have differed on the effect to
be given the Act. s Another obstacle, still recognized in six states, is the
disability of a wife to contract in such matters with her husband."0
13. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488 (1940) ; Old Colony Ry. v. Conm'r, 284 U. S.
552 (1932). But see KrrEI, FEDERAL Ixco. TAXATioN (1929) § 16:4.
14. Litigation in the various states has not always been directly on the issue of sealed
notes. Kennedy v. Collins, 30 Del. 426, 108 AtI. 48 (Super. Ct. 1919); Grand Lodge,
K. of P. v. State Bank, 79 Fla. 471, 84 So. 528 (1920); Sivell v. Hogan, 119 Ga. 167,
46 S. E. 67 (1903) ; Wagner v. McClay, 306 Ill. 560, 138 N. E. 164 (1923) ; Goodwin
v. Cabot Amusement Co., 129 Me. 36, 149 Atl. 574 (1930) ; Roth v. Baltimore Trust Co.,
161 Md. 340, 158 AUt. 32 (1931) ; Page v. Trufant, 2 Mass. 159, 3 Am. Dec. 41 (1806) ;
Hale v. Dressen, 73 Minn. 277, 76 N. NV. 31 (1898); Aller v. Aller, 40 N. J. L. 446
(1878); Basketeria Stores, Inc. v. Public Indemnity Co., 204 N. C. 537, 16S S. F. 822
(1933) ; Miles v. Hemenway, 59 Ore. 318, 117 P. 273 (1911) ; Balliet v. Fetter, 314 Pa.
284, 171 AUt. 466 (1934) ; Bandy v. Bandy, 187 S. C. 410, 197 S. E. 396 (1938) ; George-
town v. Reynolds, 161 Va. 164, 170 S. E. 741 (1933); Singer v. General Ace. Fire &
Life, 219 Wis. 508, 262 N. V. 702 (1935). For legislative modification of seal, see
1 WnnsroN, Co~NTcTs (2d ed. 1936) §§ 109, 218; Comment, The Present Status of the
Sealed Obligation (1939) 34 ILL. L. Rav. 457.
15. Lorenzen, The Validity and Effect of Contracts in Conflicts of Laws (1921) 30
YALE L. J. 565, 655; Beale, What Law Govcrns the Validity of a Contract (1910) 23
HARv. L. Rav. 1, 79, 194, 260; REsTATEMUENT, CoN-FLicT OF LAws (1934) § 311.
16. Now adopted in every state. 5 U. L. A. p. iii.
17. UNIoRX NEGOTLIALE INsTRTuM ETs LAW § 6(4) and § 28.
18. Common law presumption of seal retained: Kennedy v. Collins, 30 Del. 426,
108 At. 48 (Super. Ct. 1919) ; Balliet v. Fetter, 314 Pa. 284, 171 AU. 466 (1934). Contra:
Citizens Bank of Blakely v. Hall, 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496 (1934), (1935) 97 A. L I_
617; Citizens Nat. Bank of Pocomoke v. Curtis, 153 Md. 235, 138 AtI. 261 (1927), (1928)
53 A. L. R. 1173; Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C. 788, 167 S. E. 74 (1933). See BnA,;.''s
NEGoTILBrE INSTRUMENTs LAW (6th ed. 1938) 190-191, 417-424; Comment (1939) 34
ILL. L. REV. 457, 477.
19. Of the six jurisdictions which cling to this legal anachronism (Florida, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Vermont) two (Florida, Massachusetts) also up-
hold the common law position of the seal. However, since the restriction was originally
designed for the wife's protection, it is doubtful if her legal incapacity would invalidate
a sealed unilateral contract in which the wife makes no promise. For state by state
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By approving use of intra-family notes without consideration, the case
suggests legal vistas which spread beyond the confines of sealed instruments.
Since the facts of the instant case are unique, they must be analyzed in the
light of decisions concerning unsealed notes. If, in tax matters, the court
will sustain a sealed obligation where there is no consideration, there may
be stronger argument, a fortiori, when consideration does pass. A striking
example of the potentialities of the latter situation is manifest in the Charles
Steele case.20 In that case, an American financier made a gift of a million
dollar check to his wife in 1917; two days later he borrowed the same amount
from her and gave his 6% secured notes in return. The Board of Tax Ap-
peals approved the annual $60,000 interest deductions.
21
To indicate the uses of promissory notes which are likely to result in
interest deductions, a threefold division of the cases is helpful. In the first
category are notes usually given in exchange for mere "love and affection,"
which are only unenforceable promises to make a future gift of both principal
and interest. 22 Those who make or endorse2 3 such notes without considera-
tion cannot deduct annual cash payments as there is neither "indebtedness"
nor "interest," but only a barren promise or gift. Giving collateral with the
note makes it no more binding, for the promisor cannot supply consideration
for his own promise.24 In the second group are notes given in return for
sufficient consideration. There appears to be no doubt of the bona fide
character of such transactions.
2
5
In the third class are those cases in which the complete plan may be open
to question, even assuming compliance with the letter of the law. 20 In these
instances, although courts frequently deny its existence, consideration in the
variations, see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1936) 771; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAt-
ILY LAWS (1931) 65.
20. 38 B. T. A. 589 (1938).
21. Ibid. The Board was impressed by non-tax advantages. Mr. Steele claimed that
to avoid the financial uncertainties of the war a secured note would give his wife prece-
dence as to his individual property over creditors of J. P. Morgan & Co., of which ho
was a partner. There is, however, reason to doubt the value of this case as a precedent
in the light of the present attitude of the courts toward tax evasion schemes and of the
peculiar circumstances of the case.
22. Simon Benson, 9 B. T. A. 279 (1927); Jamie A. Bennett, 40 B. T. A. 745
(1939); Julius G. Day, 42 B. T. A. No. 21 (June 18, 1940). For further classification
of cases, see 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW Ov FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 24.01
to § 24.13.
23. Jamie A. Bennett, 40 B. T. A. 745 (1939).
24. Julius G. Day, 42 B. T. A. No. 21 (June 18, 1940). In the Park case, the Board
of Tax Appeals stated that "a collateral note is enforceable, at least to the extent of the
collateral, regardless of whether or not it is under seal," citing Dando's Appeal, 94 Pa.
76 (1880). This appears to be an unwarranted interpretation of the case cited.
25. Samuel Shapiro, 29 B. T. A. 1012 (1934); William V. Couchman, 30 B. T. A.
118 (1934); D. S. DeVan, 34 B. T. A. 580 (1936).
26. Gilman v. Comm'r, 53 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Johnson v. Comm'r,
86 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Longyear v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 116 (App. D. C.
1935) ; Edwin M. Klein, 31 B. T. A. 910 (1934) ; Charles Steele, 38 B. T. A. 589 (1938) ;
Mildred K. Hyde, 42 B. T. A. No. 112 (Sept. 25, 1940) ; see also Hearings Before Joint
Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 92-120, 240-241.
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ordinary contract sense is present; but suspicion is cast on the entire trans-
action as a possible evasion method. What constitutes evasion has never been
satisfactorily defined for predictive purposes.2 7 In trying to establish the
line separating legal avoidance from illegal evasion,28 one is aided by the
wide range of factual gradations reflected in the legislative hearings as well
as in case reports. At one extreme is a plan circularized by tax consultants
and adopted by wealthy eastern residents, whereby a taxpayer gave his note
for about $3,000,000 at 5%o in payment for the single premium on a $4,000,000
life insurance policy in a Nassau insurance corporation which had only $S8,361
in assets.29 Less fantastic yet ingenious is the plan which involved the
creation of a trust by a wife with funds given by her husband. Then, as
agreed, he gave his interest bearing note to the trustee in return for the money
he had originally given his wife. The interest which he paid to the trustee
and which was then used to pay his insurance was held non-deductible. 3
Similarly, a transaction in which the husband gave his wife a non-negotiable,
non-assignable, and non-pledgeable note voidable on his death in exchange
for previously assigned securities was not recognized for taxation purposes 31
Nor can the interest on a note be deducted if, in substance, it is the equiva-
lent of alimony.3 2
In these situations, the amount and character of consideration is not always
judged by strict adherence to the law of contracts. Since the cases illustrate
that even interest on legally enforceable notes may be non-deductible, it
appears that although the enforceability of a sealed note may be at the base
of the court's position in the Park case, it is not always a conclusive or
exclusive test. Possibly the decisive factors in sustaining the deduction in
the case were the husband's good faith in securing the note,m the risks he
took because it was valid, and the comparatively low surtaxes in 1923.
Such elements apparently counterbalanced the fact that it was a family trans-
action or that no demand was made for eleven years; the majority explicitly
stated that they found "no suggestion in the stipulation of facts . . . that
it was entered into to avoid taxes." In the "mystic field" 34 of tax avoidance
it appears to a matter of degree as to whether the court will be so aroused
27. Hearings Beforc Joint Comnittec on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 10-16; PAUL, STUDIES IN FrEDEAL TAxATiON (1937) 12-19; Bud:,
Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Some General Considcrations (1937) 25 GEa.
L. J. 863.
28. Factors determining the line of judicial approval are discussed in the folloving:
PAUL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 9-157; Buck, supra note 27, at 863; Rudick, snpra note 1,
at 243.
29. Hearings cited supra note 27, at 96. See also Paul, Tic Baelground of the
Revenue Act of 1937 (1937) 5 U. OF CHL L REv. 41, 56.
30. Johnson v. Comm'r, 86 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), discussed in PAUL, op.
cit. supra note 27, at 145.
31. Gilman v. Comm'r, 53 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
32. Longyear v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 116 (App. D. C. 1935); Mildred K. Hyde,
42 B. T. A. No. 112 (Sept. 25, 1940).
33. This reason is explicitly stated by the court at p. 354 of the opinion.
34. PAUL, op. cit. mpra note 27, at 73.
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by the action of the taxpayer as to upset the tax advantages of what may
otherwise be a legally foolproof sequence of events.
Whoever follows the Park case as a precedent, however, is not only faced
with a possible shift in judicial interpretation towards greater taxability,m
but also with the fact that a gift tax may negate any saving in income taxesA0
Not only does the gift tax apply to notes under seal, but also to instances
where the consideration received for the note is not the monetary equivalent
of the face amount. The difference between what is given and what is
acquired is subject to the tax.3 7 It is quite possible, however, that a tax-
payer may save more on interest deductions in his income tax than he spends
on the gift tax, particularly if he can still take advantage of his specific gift
tax exemption.38
Examining the same situation with a view to saving gift taxes rather than
income taxes, the use of the sealed note points the way to make a gift with-
out, in substance, paying a gift tax. Thus if a husband makes his wife a gift
of a sealed note, he is obliged to pay a gift tax,3 9 but as he pays the interest
on the note, the savings in income tax because of the deductions for interest
will serve over a period of years to recoup the single gift tax payment plus
interest. If the annual payments on the note are, however, construed as gifts
for the purpose of the gift tax the device is obviously less economical,40 and
greater uncertainty might well result concerning income tax deductions.
Moreover, since to recapture the amount of the gift tax takes a number of
years, the risk of the donor's death and the possible removal of his income
from the high surtax brackets may discourage prospective users of this device.
From a practical viewpoint, use of a sealed note is an advantageous type
of gift as a consequence of the general decline in investment yields. Thus,
where the aim of the gift is to provide a definite yearly income to the donee,
a gift in the form of a sealed note for $100,000 at 6% will entitle the donee
to an income equal to 3% on a gift of ordinary securities valued at $200,000.
Since the gift tax on the note 4' may be appreciably less than on the gift of
securities, 42 the saving to the donor is apparent. On the other hand, for
purposes of interest deductions alone, it is to the taxpayer's gain to have the
interest rate and principal as large as possible.
35. Mounting demands for revenue probably presage judicial efforts to close exist-
ing gaps in the revenue laws. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), 49 YALE
L. J. 1118.
36. INT. Rav. CODE § 1000 (1939).
37. INT. REV. CODE § 1002 (1939); U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 8.
38. INT. Rv. CODE § 1004 (1939); U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 12. In addition to the
specific exemption of $40,000, there is an annual exclusion of $4,000, applicable as many
times as there are separate donees. INT. REV. CODE § 1003 (1939); U. S. Treas. Reg.
79, Art. 10.
39. See note 36 spra.
40. See note 37 supra.
41. INT. REV. CODE § 1005 (1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(5). The value of
notes are presumed to be the amount of unpaid principal plus interest, whereas the value
of securities is said to be the fair market value on the date of the gift.
42. INT. REv. CODE § 1005 (1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(l), (3). See note
41 supra.
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Attention must also be paid to other legal results which may follow the gift
of a sealed note between the time of its delivery and its payment. For example,
the gift tax liability is probably incurred in the year of delivery of the note
rather than as of the date of payment.43 After delivery, cancellation of the
debt may result in a realization of income to the debtor.4 4 Or if the note,
once valuable, has become worthless, it is doubtful if the donee may get a
deduction from gross income for bad debts.43 Upon the death of the donor,
the unpaid sealed note cannot be deducted as a claim of indebtedness for
purposes of the federal estate tax since there is not full consideration in
money or money's worth.46 Consequently, a gift in this form will be included
in the net estate; but a credit will be allowed for the gift tax paid.4
While litigation over the sealed note has in the past involved income tax
avoidance, introduction of the gift tax has reduced the utility of the device
where the sole purpose is to save income taxes. Yet, paradoxically, the gift
tax makes the device more important for one who is primarily intent on
making a gift. But whether a gift in this manner is considered colorable may
depend partly on the ability of the taxpayer to adduce convincing reasons
for his action. Since the tax evader is a master of multiple rationaliza-
tion,48 the problem of proving intent to avoid taxes is difficult enough to
warrant plugging the loophole by a more concrete test. By adopting the
limitation used in the estate and gift taxes, "indebtedness" in Section 23(b)
could be qualified by amendment to require full or adequate consideration
43. It is to the interest and convenience of the government to collect the gift tax upon
delivery. Legally, the note is no longer within the donor's control, and presumably the
donee can convert it into cash. There is authority by implication that, since the sealed
note is enforceable, tax liability arises in the year of delivery. See Pinellas Ice Co. v.
Comm'r, 287 U. S. 462, 469 (1933) ; Lampert v. Willcuts, 15 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 789 (D.
Mfinn. 1932) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hoey, 101 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939);
Estate of John F. Dodge, 13 B. T. A. 201 (1928); Lunsford v. Richardson, 39 B. T. A.
927 (1939) ; G. C. M. XV-1, C. B. 369 (1936) ; TmaxNToN, Gi-rs (1893) 242. However,
in John D. Archbold, 42 B.T.A. No. 69 (July 31, 1940) the Board held an enforce-
able promise was not a present gift. The facts are distinguishable from the instant case,
and it is questionable if the authorities cited therein support the generalizativn. The in-
come tax cases, while not necessarily applicable, point toward date of actual payment.
Helvering v. Price, 309 U. S. 409 (1940); Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 140 (1931) ; Jen-
kins v. Bitgood, 101 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
44. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22(a)-14. Surrey, The Rvcnue Act of 1939 and the
Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtcdness (1940) 49 YALE L J. 1153; Dar-
rell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax (1940) 53 H,%v. L Rv.
977; Graham, Is Camcellation of Indebtedness Income (1938) 16 T,%x MA . 707.
45. IxT. Ray. CODE §23(k) (1) (1939). Kinkead v. Comm'r, 71 F. (2d) 522 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1934).
46. INT. REV. CoDE § 812(b) (1939). See Taft v. Comm'r, 304 U. S. 351 (1938);
Glascock v. Comm'r, 104 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
47. IxT. REv. CoDE § 813 (a) (1939).
48. If any valid ground constitutes an integral part of the plan the taxpayer may
prevail, as in the Charles Steele case. Generally, the tax purpose alone is not sufficient
to support a plan of avoidance. Comm'r v. Riggs, 78 F. (2d) 1004 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935);
Atldns v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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in money or money's worth.4 0 The sealed note as such would thereby be
devoid of tax-saving significance. But even legislative amendment is only
a partial solution. Where the note is employed within the family, the problem
can hardly be solved without modifying the legal status of husband and wife
in tax matters.50 Unless there is something more fundamental than an isolated
amendment, the solidarity of the family allows the taxpayer to surrender title
to another, yet keep dominion for himself. As long as the economic unity
of the family continues to be essentially disregarded in tax affairs, the promis-
sory note will continue to be a method of tax avoidance.
STATE COURT DETERMINATION OF REMOVABILITY AS
RES JUDICATA IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT*
THE right of removal to federal courts,' designed to safeguard litigants
from the supposed prejudices of foreign state courts, 2 has naturally been im-
plemented by vesting final determination of federal jurisdiction in the federal
courts. 3 The Supreme Court itself has carried this principle to an extreme
by holding in Kern v. Huidekoper that a proper exercise of removal juris-
diction by the federal courts will render coram non judice state proceedings,
even when they have already resulted in judgment on the merits.4 This firm
and ancient policy has tangled, however, with an equally strong but brand
new Supreme Court doctrine that jurisdiction of the subject matter may no
49. Similar provisions are used in gift and estate tax statutes. See notes 37, 46 snpra.
50. See note 1 supra. The legislature has partly recognized the economic unity of the
family concerning interest accrued. INT. REV. CODE § 24(c) (1939).
* Armour & Co. v. Kloeb, 109 F. (2d) 72 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup.
Ct. 1099 (U. S. 1940).
1. 36 STAT. 1094-99 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 71-83 (1934). The statute enables a
non-resident defendant in a state court to remove to the proper federal district court.
A suit may be removed if it involves a federal question, alienage or diversity of
citizenship, separable controversies, or local prejudice, the requisites of original federal
jurisdiction being necessary in all but a few situations. Special statutes either permit-
ting or prohibiting removal in particular types of cases are collected in 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTiCE (1938) 3509-3516.
2. On prejudice see Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Drainage Dist., 253 Fed. 491, 496
(S. D. Iowa, 1916) ; DoBIE, FEDERAL JURIsDIcTION AND PROCEDURE (1928) 346.
3. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457 (1879); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213
U. S. 207 (1909) ; Cain v. Commercial Pub. Co., 232 U. S. 124 (1914) ; LEWIS, REMOVAL
oF CAUSES (1923) 138.
4. Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485 (1880). The removal petition is granted
nunc pro tune. Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 97 (U. S. 1842). See also Ohio v. Swift &
Co., 270 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 633 (1921) (dismissal by
state court after filing of petition held void) ; Copeland v. Erie R. R., 5 F. Supp. 906,
907 (S. D. Ohio 1934) ; Newberry v. Meadows Fertilizer Co., 1 F. Supp. 665, 666 (1.. D.
N. C. 1932); Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term
1939 (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1006, 1023.
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longer be collaterally attacked when the parties have had an opportunity to
litigate in a court whose judgments are entitled to full faith and credit.
These conflicting principles recently collided for the first time in Armzour
v. Kloeb,6 which the Supreme Court has consented to review on vnit of
certiorari. Plaintiffs joined the packer and retailer of diseased pork in five
damage suits in an Ohio court, omitting to allege, but subsequently proving,
a basis for joint liability.7 The packer's petition for removal on the ground
of a separable controversy having been denied, judgment was given for plain-
tiffs. On appeal, the state supreme court reversed solely on the ground that
there was a separable controversy and that removal should have been ordered.8
The appellate court properly refused to consider more than the original com-
plaints,9 which failed to state a case of joint liability under Ohio law.' 0 Upon
subsequent removal to the federal district court, where additional jurisdictional
facts were presented, plaintiffs' motions to remand were granted." On appli-
cation to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the packer obtained
a writ of mandamus12 compelling the district judge to hear and decide the
cases. The circuit court of appeals held, citing recent Supreme Court cases,
2 3
that the state supreme court's decision was res judicata of the jurisdictional
issue.14
5. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938) ; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940) ; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 303 U. S. 66 (1939) ;
cf. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938). On the development of the doctrine of these
cases, and their present status, see Boskey and Braucher, supra note 4.
6. 109 F. (2d) 72 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 1099 (U. S.
1940).
7. The omitted allegation was that the packer knew the pork was to be sold for con-
sumption without cooking. This fact, if pleaded, would state a case of liability as joint
tortfeasors. Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N. E. (2d) 734 (1938).
S. Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N. E. (2d) 734 (1933).
9. The separability of a controversy is governed by the plaintiff's pleading at the
time the removal petition is filed. Alabama Southern Ry. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 205
(1906); Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534 (1939).
10. Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 195 N. E. 634 (1935).
11. Matters not included in the record on removal may be considered by the district
court on motion to remand under § 37 of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 109S (1911), 28 U.
S. C. § 80 (1934). This is true even where the additional facts go to the existence of a
separable controversy. Sklarsky v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 47 F. (2d) 662 (S. D. N. Y.
1931).
12. On the propriety of review by mandamus see note 23 infra.
13. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932); Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 303 U. S.
66 (1939).
14. The view that a state court's determination of the issue of removability is res
judicata has often been advanced by counsel. See, for example, North Carolina Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922). It has hitherto been sus-
tained only once by a federal court. Beadleston v. Harpending, 32 Fed. 644 (C. C. E. D.
N. Y. 1887) (order of remand on ground that unreversed decision of state lower court
denying removal estopped defendant to contest motion to remand). Cf. Springer v.
Howes, 69 Fed. 849 (C. C. R. D. N. C. 1895). But ef. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe,
213 U. S. 207 (1909).
19401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The contrary conclusions of the Ohio supreme court and the federal dis-
trict court on the issue of separability arise from a curious overlapping of
the functions of the respective courts in making a determination of remova-
bility. Despite the finality of determination vested in the federal system, a
state court's function upon the presentation of a removal petition'0 is more
than ministerial. Precedent to a state court's statutory duty to accept the
petition and bond and proceed no further is its determination that the cause
is removable. 10 This question, as it confronts the state court, is purely one
of law, all facts appearing in the complaint being accepted as true.17 When
a separable controversy is alleged, this decision by the state court is par-
ticularly important. In such a situation, state law governs the construction
of plaintiff's pleading and the determination of whether his cause of action,
as pleaded, is one on which the liability of the defendants may be joint.18
As a result, the instances of extensive litigation in state tribunals of the
removability issue, although limited to questions of law on the face of the
record, are numerous.19
The power of federal district courts to determine removability is broader
than that of state courts. The district court has exclusive jurisdiction to
decide factual issues, however brought to its attention.20 Despite the the-
oretical possibility that conflict between state and federal systems is avoided
by differentiating the decisions of law on the basis of variations in the facts
pertinent to removal which may be considered, 21 the cases reveal that, as a
practical matter, district courts have often exercised independent judgments
on the same questions of law which confronted the state tribunals. 22 Where
15. A petition and bond for removal must under the general removal statute be filed
in the first instance in the state court. 36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 72 (1934).
16. 36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 72 (1934). The duty is expressly conditioned
upon a determination that the suit is removable within the purview of the statute,
17. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430 (1886) ; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279
(1886) ; Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513 (1887) ; DomE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 451.
18. Chicago & Alton R. R. v. McWhirt, 243 U. S. 422 (1917); Cincinnati & Texas
Pac. Ry. v. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221 (1906) ; Illinois Central R. R. v. Sheegog, 215 U. S.
308 (1909); Norwalk v. Air-Way Elec. Appliance Corp., 87 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937). But cf. Alabama Southern Ry. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206 (1906) ; Note (1920)
33 HARV. L. REV. 970, 971. A determination of separability by the highest state court
is final on review in the Supreme Court, Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S.
184 (1913), and in the district court, Fournet v. DeVilbliss, 24 F. Supp. 60 (W. D. La.
1938).
19. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207 (1909) ; Illinois Central R. R.
v. Sheegog, 215 U. S. 308 (1909) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Whiteaker, 239 U. S. 421
(1915); Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. American Ins. Co., 190 N. C. 801, 130 S. E.
864 (1926), 26 COL. L. REv. 629. State interlocutory appeals are sometimes allowed
from rulings on removal petitions. Compare Fournet v. De Vilbliss, 187 La. 191, 174 So.
259 (1937) and Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. American Ins. Co., supra, with Pioneer
S. S. Co. v. Sanday, 210 App. Div. 318, 206 N. Y. S. 338 (4th Dep't 1924).
20. See note 11 supra.
21. DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (Black's ed. 1898) § 191.
22. The clearest instance of such practice appears in Le Manquais v. Glick, 17 F.
Supp. 347 (W. D. Tex. 1936). See also DILLON, Op. cit. supra note 21, at § 191; LVls,
REMOVAL OF CAUSES (1923) § 37.
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this divergence of legal opinion culminates in a district court order of remand,
it is clear by statute and decision that the district court's interpretation may
not be reviewed directly or collaterally by any state or federal courtY2 And
even where the district court's disagreement with the state court results in
an assumption of jurisdiction, its independent judgment has been affirmed
by circuit courts of appeal
2 4 and the Supreme Court'
25
The jurisdictional confusion resulting from this overlapping of federal and
state power to determine removability may be cleared in several ways. But
the solution offered by Armour v. Kloeb, that the state court's decision on
removability is res judicata, is unsound. In the precise situation before the
circuit court of appeals there was no logical basis for an application of res
judicata. That doctrine applies only to matters which were actually raised
or which could have been raised in the prior litigation.20 The defendant in
the state court, limited by the facts pleaded by the plaintiffs, had no oppor-
tunity to litigate the question of law as it was presented to the federal court.
Res judicata, moreover, may be inappropriate in view of the probability that
the litigation in both sets of courts is a single proceeding.27
Even when the factual basis of the legal question of removability confront-
ing both courts is the same, application of the principles of res judicata seems
undesirable. In those cases where the employment of res judicata would
uphold the state court's decision that the cause was not removable - a
"usurpation" of federal jurisdiction -the Supreme Court's own limitation
23. ". . . No appeal or writ of error from the decision (to remand] . . . shall be
allowed." 36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1934). The spirit of the statute for-
bids review by mandamus. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374 (1937).
It applies also to prohibition, certiorari, and injunction. In re Satterly, 102 F. (2d) 144
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939). A state court cannot attack an order of remand. State v. Wibau
County Bank, 85 'Mont. 532, 281 Pac. 341 (1929). Review by mandamus has been per-
mitted by lower federal courts if the remand order was based on "procedural" grounds,
Bankers Sec. Corp. v. Insurance Eq. Corp., 85 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936), and
when remand is ordered because of a remittitur, Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America
v. Smith, 71 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). But ef. Ex parte Bopst, 95 F. (2d) 8
(C. C. A. 4th, 1938). See Note (1938) 114 A. L. M. 1476. Under the statute it is possi-
ble to confine the prohibition of review to remand orders based on "improper removal."
Thus mandamus was held to lie in the Travelers case, supra, where removal had been
proper but remand was ordered under Section 37 of the Judicial Code. 36 STAT. 1093
(1911), 28 U. S. C. § 80 (1934). The decision in the instant case was facilitated by In re
Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U. S. 312 (1910) (mandamus issued to review an order of
remand by district judge in excess of his authority).
24. Ohio v. Swift & Co., 270 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921).
25. "We think it was the intention of Congress to confer upon the [district] court
. a right to determine the removability of a cause, independently of the jurisdiction
and determination of the state courts." Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S.
207, 217 (1909).
26. 2 FRxEEmx_, JuDcaNrs (Tuttle's ed. 1925) § 688.
27. The statute lays the basis for the conclusion that a removed case is part of the
same proceeding by declaring that the federal court proceeds as if the case had been
brought there by original process. 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 81 (1934). See
Savell v. Southern Ry., 93 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
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on the use of the doctrine, expressed in Kalb v. Feuerstein,2 would apply.
In that case collateral attack upon a state judgment of foreclosure was
permitted in order to effectuate the Congressional policy of rehabilitating
farmers under the Frazier-Lemke Act. So long as fear of local prejudice,
however unrealistic,2 9 remains a basis for federal jurisdiction, the policy of
vesting final determination of removal jurisdiction in federal courts seems
strictly analogous to the policy motivating the Kalb decision.80 And in those
cases where the state court holds a case to be removable, thus precluding
any charge of usurpation of jurisdiction, still another overriding federal policy
might call into play the reasoning of the Kalb case. This latter policy - to
prevent expansion of federal jurisdiction beyond statutory limits - is asserted
in Section 37 of the Judicial Code, which permits a federal court to dismiss
or remand if at any time lack of jurisdiction becomes apparent.81 On the
other hand, it is arguable that the policy embodied in Section 37 is not so
clear3 2 that it should be used to avoid the effects of the fixed policy of res
judicata which the Supreme Court has so carefully nurtured in the past few
years.
With the possible exception of those cases where the state court orders
removal, therefore,33 an easy conclusion might be reached that the rulings
of the state courts on removability are always susceptible to collateral attack,
and are never res judicata in the federal courts. But the typical cases may
be complicated by extensive litigation on the merits in the state courts sub-
sequent to denial of the application to remove. Under Kern v. Hiddekoper
such litigation has hitherto had no effect upon the right of the federal court
28. 308 U. S. 433 (1940) ; accord, Walker v. Detwiler, 110 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A,
6th, 1940).
29. Dobie, Conflict between State and Federal Courts (1933) 19 VA. L, REV. 485,
492.
30. To the effect that any established federal policy might prevail over the arguments
against collateral attack, see United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U. S,
506 (1940) (judgment on cross-claim void because public policy demands that a sover-
eign be immune from suit). And see Boskey and Braucher, supra note 4, at 1029.
31. It was the purpose of Congress in enacting the present removal statutes to reduce
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 18 CoNG. REc. 2727 (1887). Doubts as to remova-
bility generally result in remand. Plant v. Harrison, 101 Fed. 307 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1900) ; Richard v. National City Bank, 6 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; LEwis, RE.-
MOVAL OF CAUsEs (1923) §§ 35,292. A removing defendant may urge lack of federal juris-
diction in the circuit court of appeals. Bailey v. Texas Co., 47 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931). Lack of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time by the Supreme Court. Mans-
field, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884). But cf. St. Paul
Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283 (1938). The trend has been toward narrower
jurisdictional limits. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499.
32. See St. Paul Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283 (1938) (court must re-
mand only when plaintiff's claim never could have reached $3,000, not when it was re-
duced to prevent removal); Schlesinger and Strasburger, Divestment of Federal Jfuris-
diction: A Trapdoor Section in. the Judicial Code (1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 595.
33. This is the conclusion reached by Boskey and Braucher, supra note 4, at 1024.
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to determine its jurisdiction independently.34 But the Kern case was decided
before the development by the Supreme Court of the policy of restricting
litigants to one day in court. Consequently, although the doctrinal obstacles
to the use of res judicata in removal cases might be insurmountable, re-
examination of Kern v. Huidekopcr with a view to more frequent application
of the principles of waiver seems a possible solution. The equitable arguments
in favor of utilizing the waiver concept are persuasive. A plaintiff creates
a basis for estoppel when he contests a removal petition in the state court
instead of waiting for his opportunity to contest by motion to remand in the
district court. Defendant, if the state court declines to acquiesce in his peti-
tion to remove, may always on his own initiative file the record in the district
court 35 and apply for an injunction against further state proceedings.30 If
the defendant, instead, chooses to continue litigation in the state courts, waiver
arguments should halt any belated attempt to avoid the effect of the state
proceedings.37 Indeed, a changed view by the Supreme Court of the effect
of a defendant's failure to apply for an order restraining further litigation
in the state courts is indicated in the recent case of Fischer v. Pauline Oil &
Gas Company. s There a state judgment lien was upheld against collateral
attack by an assignee of the trustee in bankruptcy because of the trustee's
failure to secure a judicial stay of execution. Even the overriding bankruptcy
power failed to bring into play the rule of Kalb vu. Feuerstein.0
So long as federal district courts are able to continue to exercise independent
judgments on removability, however, orders to remand will create troublesome
34. See note 4 supra. A defendant who defends on the merits in the state courts after
denial of his removal petition does not aive his right to remove. Home Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunn, 19 Wall. 214 (U. S. 1873) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. . v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5 (1831) ;
Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 169 U. S. 92 (1898). It is the theory of these cases
that the removing party is forced to defend in a court which has usurped jurisdiction.
Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485 (1880). Filing the record in the federal court within
the statutory period is not jurisdictional, but merely allows a federal court which already
has jurisdiction to proceed to a determination of removability. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
v. Koontz, supra. But cf. Iowa Cent. Ry. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305 (1915).
35. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Cockrell, 232 U. S. 146 (1914). If the state court
refuses to certify the record, defendant may resort to the federal district court for a writ
of certiorari "commanding said state court to make return of the record." 36 STAT. 1699
(1911), 28 U. S. C. § 82 (1934).
36. Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494 (1830); LEwis, op. cit. supra note 22, at
§282.
37. A defendant who subsequent to the state court's denial of his petition applies for
affirmative relief by way of counterclaim or recoupment in that court is held to have
waived his right to remove. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Eastin, 214 U. S. 153 (1989). Since
other courses are open to the defendant, the logic of waiver is equally compelling where
he contests the merits in the state court.
38. 309 U. S. 294 (1940).
39. In the Kalb case, where the stay was automatic, litigation in the state court would
probably not have prevented collateral attack. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 303 U. S. 433, 444
(1940). Since in the removal situation there is no stay of state proceedings except after
a judicial determination of the issue of removability by the federal court, the Supreme
Court might hold that failure to obtain such a stay before the state court proceeded would
preclude collateral attack upon its adjudication.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
problems to state courts already committed to the removability of the case.
On remand, a plaintiff may encounter the argument that the law of the case
in the state courts has disavowed state jurisdiction. In a case such as Armour
v. Kloeb, where the federal court's order of remand was based on facts not
previously considered by the state court, amended pleadings would furnish
an obvious solution.40 Moreover, even where such factual differences did not
occur, plaintiff would not be without a remedy. It is well settled that a state
court may not review an order of remand.41 Furthermore, the plaintiff could
invoke the rule that state jurisdiction is not terminated by a state court's
order of removal if the cause is not in fact removable.
42
The existing power of the state court to make a judicial determination
of removability, inconsistent as it is with the emphasis upon protection from
state interference of the right to remove, is the cause of all the jurisdictional
difficulties which arise. Since this power has led to conflict, there seems to
be little reason for its continued acceptance, particularly in view of the fact
that the issue of removability is a matter which, in the interests of orderly
administration, requires a final determination at the outset in each case. Such
orderly administration might well be achieved by adoption of the procedure
specified in removals on the ground of local prejudice, where the petition is
filed only in the district court.
4 3
The decision of the circuit court of appeals in Armour v. Kloeb is unsound
from several viewpoints. Vindication of the district court order of remand
would be proper on the established rule that such an order is not reviewable
at all by the circuit court of appeals. 44 Moreover, application of the doctrine
of res judicata cannot abridge the power of a district court to determine its
own jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Judicial Code. Since on all the
facts the case is not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a return
to the state courts would not prejudice any rights of the removing defendant.
Remand would be proper, also, as the most convenient rule of administration,
for the judgment of the lower state court might be reinstated, whereas a
trial de novo would be inevitable if the case were to remain in the federal
courts.
40. The doctrine of "the law of the case" applies only to questions of law and is con-
fined to subsequent proceedings in the same case. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (Tuttle's ed.
1925) 1328. The law of this case is that on the face of the original pleadings a separable
controversy existed. Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N. E. (2d) 734
(1938). The Ohio statute is liberal in permitting amendments before or after judgment
to conform to the proof. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 11363. Failure to allow
amendment was therefore due to the rule that the existence of a separable controversy is
determined from the pleadings as they stand at the time the removal petition was filed.
See note 9 supra. By amending, plaintiffs may state a joint cause of action and therefore
the question of law previously decided by the state supreme court would be inapplicable.
41. See note 23 rupra. A decision of the highest state court dismissing plaintiff's
amended complaint could be reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari. 43 STAT. 937
(1925), 28 U. S. C. §344b (1934).
42. jurisdiction of the state court is regarded as never having been divested. See
DOmIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1928) 455; DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES
(Black's ed., 1898) 310.
43. 36 STAT. 1094, 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 71, 72.
44. See note 23 supra.
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JURISDICTION OF A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURT
TO RULE ON STATE TAXES*
CONGRESS has long pursued a policy of limiting the jurisdiction of federal
courts in order to preserve the vitality of state courts and administrative
boards, especially with respect to matters essentially local.' At the same time,
Congress has steadily broadened federal jurisdiction in the field of bankruptcy
administration.2 When both of these competing policies seem applicable to
the facts of a single case, a serious jurisdictional question arises. This problem
is presented when a trustee for a railroad in reorganization seeks to transfer
a dispute over a state tax from a state tribunal to the bankruptcy court.
Confronted squarely with this situation in ln re Missouri Pacific Railroad,3
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri decided in favor of
the bankruptcy court's (i.e., its own) jurisdiction. The case arose out of
a tax levied against the Missouri Pacific by the Arkansas Corporation Com-
mission, which is charged with the duty of assessing for taxation railroad
property in that state.4 At the time of the levy, the railroad was undergoing
reorganization in accordance with Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.3 The
trustee in bankruptcy challenged the validity of the assessment;" but instead
of pursuing the remedy afforded by Arkansas statute and appealing to the
courts of the state,7 he chose to petition the federal court to determine the
amount and legality of the disputed tax. The state moved to dismiss on the
*ln re Missouri P. R.R., 33 F. Supp. 728 (E. D. Mo. 1940).
1. Since the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 STAT. 470 (1875), which granted jurisdiction
to federal courts to hear cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States, Congress has on four different occasions limited the jurisdiction of federal
courts to adjudicate suits involving state statutes and administrative orders: The Mann-
Elkins Act, 36 STAT. 539, 557 (1910), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1934); The Act of March 4,
1913, 37 STAT. 1013 (1913), 28 U. S.C. § 380 (1934); The Johnson Act, 48 STAT. 775
(1934), 28 U.S. C. § 41(1) (1934); and The Act of August 21, 1937, 50 STAT. 738
(1937), 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (Supp. 1938). See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CoRN. L Q. 499; Pogue,
State Determination of State Law and the Judicial Code (1928) 41 HAnv. L REV. 623;
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAnv. L REv. 345.
2. The jurisdiction of district courts engaged in corporate reorganization has been
widely extended by the recent amendments to the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
See 47 STAT. 1467 (1933), and 52 STAT. 840, 11 U.S. C. § 11 (Supp. 1938). For dis-
cussion of the history of federal bankruptcy legislation, see COLLIER oN BANKRuPTcY
(14th ed. 1940) 6-23; WARREN, BANXRUPTCY IN THE UxrrM STATES HIsTORY (1935).
3. 33 F. Supp. 728 (E. D. Mo. 1940).
4. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 36, § 2038.
5. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended by 49 STAT. 911 (1935) and 49 STAT. 1969
(1936), 11 U.S. C. §205 (Supp. 1938).
6. The Commission assessed the taxable property of the Missouri Pacific by first
computing the total system value of the railroad, then applying an allocation factor so
as to assign to Arkansas its proper part of the system value. The trustee's objection
rested entirely on the formula used by the commission to compute the total system value
of the railroad.
7. ARmY DIa. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 36, §§ 2019, 2020.
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basis of the 1937 amendment to the Judicial Code, which prohibits federal
courts from enjoining the collection of state taxes.8 In denying the motion,
the court held this provision of the Judicial Code inapplicable because no
injunction was involved. The court found further that its jurisdiction was
not only authorized but compelled by that part of Section 64a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act which provides that "in case any question arises as to the amount
or legality of any taxes, such questions shall be heard and determined by
the [bankruptcy] court." 9
The district court, by relying so heavily on Section 64a,10 seems to have
disposed of the question too easily." In view of the policy enunciated in the
1937 amendment to the Judicial Code, it is at least debatable whether the
word "shall" means "must" or whether it connotes "may" in the sense of
a statutory grant of power to decide the issues. Furthermore, federal courts
have frequently, in the exercise of wise judicial discretion, relinquished their
jurisdiction in exceptional cases and permitted state courts to hear suits in
which important local issues were at stake and the available state remedy
was adequate.' 2 In these cases, moreover, jurisdiction was based on statutes
no less specific than Section 64a. The trustee in the principal case did not
dispute the adequacy of the relief provided by Arkansas law. Consequently,
8. The Act of Aug. 21, 1937, 50 STAT. 738, 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (Supp. 1938) pro-
vides in part: ". . . no district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend,
or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to the
laws of any State where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or
in equity in the courts of such State."
9. 52 STAT. 874, 11 U. S. C. § 104(a) (Supp. 1938). This provision has been in'
the National Bankruptcy Act since 1898 with only minor cfianges.
10. It is clear that § 64a applies to railroads in reorganization nnder § 77. See New
Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483 (1906); In re New York, 0. & W. Ry., 25 F. Supp.
709 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
11. The court based its decision primarily on Board of Directors of St. Francis
Levee Dist., 98 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S, 647 (1938).
Except for the fact that an injunction was asked to restrain proceedings in the state
court, this case involved substantially the same facts as the principal case. The suit was
instituted, however, before the 1937 amendment to § 24 of the Judicial Code [quoted
in part in note 8 supra] was passed and by its terms the statute was inapplicable. The
act was referred to by the levee district only to show the trend of Congress to limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts with reference to suits pending in state courts.
12. For cases in which jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship was relinquished,
see Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935) ; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.
288 U. S. 123 (1933). In Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159
(1929), where jurisdiction was based on the existence of a federal question, the Supreme
Court held that since the state courts afforded an ample opportunity to determine a
question of state law, the district court abused its discretion in enjoining any attempt
to contest the raising of fares by the transit company. See also Foust v. Munson, 299
U. S. 77 (1936) (jurisdiction relinquished although the bankruptcy court had statutory
power to "enjoin or stay the commencement of suits against the debtor until after the
final decree") ; Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U. S. 284 (1937) ; In re Sentinel Oil Co., 12 F.
Supp. 294 (S. D. Cal. 1935), ("exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property
wherever located" surrendered). See 5 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1931)
§§ 2045, 2370.
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unless the nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction forecloses the possibility, the
court, with a "scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state gov-
ernments"'13 which district courts have always been required to employ,
4
might well have considered whether a state tax suit was an exceptional case
of the type which should be left to a state court.
The fact that by virtue of its bankruptcy jurisdiction a court gets exclusive
possession of the debtor's estate does not provide a satisfactory reason for
refusing to relinquish jurisdiction over a local issue.15 In Riche v. .lMar-
golies,1  Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that an order to pay a creditor
out of the estate of the bankrupt has a two-fold aspect. In so far as such an
order directs the distribution of the estate, it deals directly with the property.
But an action to determine the validity or amount of a creditor's claim is
strictly in personam and may be heard by any court which has jurisdiction
of the subject matter. With respect to the second aspect, then, a bankruptcy
court would seem to have discretion to refuse jurisdiction. The problem in
the principal case - i.e., the adjudication of the state's tax claim - was con-
cerned solely with this second aspect. Were the federal tribunal to exercise
its discretion and leave adjudication of the claim to the Arkansas court, the
state decision would of course be res judicata as to the issue litigated'T-
namely, the amount due the state for taxes. As a "tax due and owing,"
the judgment would constitute a priority to be paid in full under Section
64a(4). 18 Since the reorganization would in no way be impeded, and since
13. Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932).
14. The Supreme Court, an especially zealous guardian f the right! -'f state cuurts,
has branded failure of district courts to relinquish jurisdiction tf suits involving essen-
tially local problems as an abuse of judicial discretion. See, in addition to the cases
cited in note 12 supra, Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940);
Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1931) ; Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 284 U. S.
530 (1931); (1932) 41 YAnm L. J. 769; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1925).
15. The cases traditionally cited as authority for the proposition that the bankruptcy
court's possession of the debtor's property gives it jurisdiction to hear all claims against
the debtor are Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610 (1933) and Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie &
Lumber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1930). See (1938) 38 Co. L. Rrv. 674 for argument that
the Dowghue case, cited supra note 12, overrules the Hobl's case. It is important to
note that in the opinions of both the Baldwin and Hobbs cases there is a provision that
the bankruptcy court, in the exercise of its discretion, might conclude that it is desirable
to permit the state court to adjudicate a particular suit.
16. 279 U. S. 218 (1928).
17. In addition to Riehle v. Margolies, see Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
309 U. S. 478 (1940); Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U. S. 284 (1937) ; Bankers Trust Co.
v. Palmer, 109 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); In re Adams Bldg. Corp., 27 F. Supp.
247 (N. D. Ill. 1939), afj'd, 105 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), (1940) 7 U. oF C1n1.
L. Rav. 717; Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 104 F. (2d) 1, 9 (CC. A. Sth, 1939k,
cert. denied, 308 U. S. 559 (1939) ; Kelly v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 9th,
1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 730 (1937) ; In re Schulte United, Inc., 49 F. (2d) 264
(C. C.A. 2d, 1931).
18. Section 64a provides in part: "The debts to have priority, in advance of the
payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of the bankrupt estates, and
the order of payment shall be . . . (4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt
to the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof."
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jurisdiction should hardly be conferred on the bankruptcy court on the ground
that the debtor's interests deserve more sympathetic treatment than a state
court would give, no valid reason appears to compel district courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction acquired by virtue of bankruptcy.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court, moreover, indicate that in some
instances the bankruptcy court is not a proper tribunal to determine questions
arising under state law. In Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,19 for
example, the Supreme Court held that the district court should have renounced
its jurisdiction to determine the validity of the debtor's claim to certain oil
property, since such claim depended upon the construction of a state statute.
And in Palmer v. Massachusetts20 the bankruptcy court was denied jurisdic-
tion to order the abandonment of certain railroad stations operated by the
debtor, for the reason that local interests of the first importance were at stake.
The instant case presented a problem of a somewhat different nature from
either of these cases, since it involved neither a previously uninterpreted state
statute, as in the Magnolia case, nor the exercise by a district court of a
jurisdiction for which specific statutory authority was lacking, as in the
Palmer case. But in neither of the Supreme Court cases does the opinion
convey the impression that the basis for decision was the factor which dis-
tinguishes each from the principal case. Instead, the prevailing note, also
strongly present in the principal case, is the inherently local problem in-
volved.
21
There appears to be, then, no compelling reason for the bankruptcy court
to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. On the other hand, there are sound
considerations of policy v.hich dictate the conclusion that this problem should
be left to the determination of the Arkansas courts. The first, suggested by
the opinion in the Palmer case, is that a federal judge sitting in Missouri is
far less able to pass wise judgment on a claim arising under an Arkansas
statute than is an Arkansas judge.22 A second reason is that state officials
19. 309 U. S. 478 (1940). The question presented was whether tinder Illinois law
a railroad in reorganization had fee simple title to oil under land to which the railroad
had acquired a right of way. The Court, through Mr. Justice Black, said: "A court
of bankruptcy has an exclusive and nondelegable control over the administration of an
estate in its possession. But the proper exercise of that control may, where the interests
of the estate and the parties will best be served, lead the bankruptcy court to consent
to submission to state courts of particular controversies . . ." (id. at p. 483).
20. 308 U. S. 79 (1939). Palmer, trustee in bankruptcy for the New Haven Road,
petitioned the district court in which reorganization proceedings were in progress to
order the abandonment of certain passenger stations in Massachusetts operated by the
debtor's lessee. The Supreme Court held that only the Massachusetts Department of
Public Utilities could order the abandonment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "But . . .
against possible inconveniences due to observance of state law we must balance the feelings
of local communities, the dislocation of their habits, and the over-riding of expert state
agencies by a single judge." (id. at p. 89).
21. For the consideration to be accorded state taxes by federal courts, see Nash-
ville, C., & St. L. R. R. v. Browning, 60 Sup. Ct. 968 (U. S. 1940). See also (1940)
7 U. oF Ciii. L. R.v. 717.
22. This would seem to be particularly true where the court is to review the technical
judgment of a state commission.
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should not be made to travel outside their own jurisdiction, possibly a dis-
tance of many miles, to litigate tax disputes. And, third, only an adjudication
by the state court will insure the wholly desirable result that all railroads
in Arkansas, solvent or insolvent, will be taxed according to a uniform for-
mula.23 In Nashville C. & St.L. R.R. v. Brownilzg24 the Supreme Court
held that even where a state tax was challenged on "due process" and "equal
protection" grounds, federal courts had to allow an over-whelming presump-
tion that the state court ruled correctly on the validity and amount of the
state tax, since the state court was better able to relate local needs and prob-
lems to the prohibitions of the Federal Constitution. To permit a railroad
in reorganization to retreat to the bankruptcy court in order to escape the
application of the state's peculiar rule by its own courts would seem to under-
mine the basis of the Browning case.2
If, in a particular case arising under unusual circumstances, it appears that
the reorganization of the debtor might be hampered or slowed by proceedings
in a state court, the bankruptcy court would be justified in refusing to re-
linquish its jurisdiction. The suggested rule is an ad hoc rule, rather than
one applicable to a whole class of cases.20 Indeed, this flexibility, permitting
a court to meet the exigencies of the particular case before it, constitutes an
important reason for preferring it to the only alternative - strict construction
of the statute, requiring all tax claims to be referred to the bankruptcy court.-
But the cases in which the bankruptcy court may be persuaded to retain juris-
diction will in all probability be so rare as to leave unimpaired the principle
that a state's tax laws are best ruled upon in its own courts.
23. Three of the four other major roads in Arkansas are in reorganization: the
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. in the district court for the northern district of Illinois; the
St. Louis-S. F. Ry. and the St. Louis S.NV. Ry. in the district court for the eastern
district of Missouri. Only the Kansas City S. Ry. is solhent. There is hardly any assur-
ance that Arkansas would have a uniform taxing system if only one out of five major
roads is subject to final determination in Arkansas.
24. 60 Sup. Ct. 968 (U. S. 1940).
25. If a railroad in reorganization can circumvent this rule, it may possibly also
circumvent the statutory requirement of a three-judge court for the issuance of inter-
locutory injunctions by seeking the injunction from the bankruptcy court, presided over
by a single judge.
26. Steelman v. All Continent Co., 301 U. S. 278 (1937) is one case in which the
reorganization was greatly facilitated by the bankruptcy court's retention of jurisdiction.
27. The trustee suggested that the state sought a hearing in the Arkansas courts,
not because it feared an unsatisfactory determination of the issue in the bankruptcy court,
but because it knew that the time for appeal to the state court had expired. Brief for
Respondent, p. 28, In re Missouri P. R. R., 33 F. Supp. 728 (E. D. Mo. 1940). This
might seem to be a valid reason for persuading the bankruptcy court to retain its juris-
diction of this case. But surely a railroad in reorganization should not be able to transfer
to a federal court a case which properly belongs to the courts of the state, simply because
it has been negligent in prosecuting its appeal. Moreover, the bankruptcy court could
refuse relief on the condition that the Arkansas court hear the case on the merits.
1940]
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INCOME ACCRUED TO A DECEDENT PARTNER UNDER THE
FEDERAL REVENUE ACTS*
UNDER the federal Revenue Acts, the representatives of decedent taxpayers
have made effective use of the amorphous concept of "taxable income" to
minimize the estate's liability for surtaxes on income accrued to a decedent
prior to his death. The ordinary taxpayer reports in his annual return only
those items of income "realized" within the taxable year,1 and the statutory
test for the time of realization 2 is whether or not the taxpayer has or should
have entered the item in his books, in accordance with the method of ac-
counting he regularly employs. 3 But this criterion is grossly unsuited to the
peculiar tax position of decedents. When death cuts short the accounting
period of an individual keeping books on the conventional cash receipts and
disbursements basis,4 only earnings actually received during his life are, under
the orthodox test, denominated taxable income. Amounts accrued but un-
collected at the date of death escape the tax burden.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1934, therefore, representatives were not
required to report, in decedents' final income tax returns, earnings for which
payment had not been actually or constructively r received. Furthermore,
executors and administrators successfully pointed out to the courts and the
Board of Tax Appeals that the ultimate receipt of these accrued amounts did
not constitute income to the estate 6 - a separate taxable entity. The practice
of accruing all income to the date of death and including the accruals in the
* Enright's Estate v. Comm'r, 112 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
1. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 153; Adams, When is Income Realiacdf,
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Columbia Univ. Lectures, 1921) 29.
2. The test does not adopt the economic theories of income. See Weuller, Concepts
of Taxable Income: The American Contribution (1938) 53 POL. ScI. Q. 557; HEwETT,
THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITs APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1925) 22-23;
Haig, The Concept of Income in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Columbia Univ. Lectures,
1921) 27.
3. "The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual ac-
counting period . . . in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in
keeping the books of such taxpayer; . . . if the method employed does not clearly reflect
the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the
opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income . . ." INT. REv. CODE § 41
(1939).
4. If a decedent ordinarily computed annual income by an accrual method of ac-
counting, his accrued earnings, of course, fall into the category of taxable income and the
tax burden is unavoidable.
5. For a constructive receipt of income the amounts must be immediately due and
payable to a taxpayer and unqualifiedly subject to his demand. See (1940) 53 HARV. L.
REv. 851. Accrued earnings are to be distinguished, since, for an accrual, the date on
which the debtor's liability matures may be in the future.
6. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 584
(1928); City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 29 B. T. A. 190 (1933); Ella C. Loose, 15
B. T. A. 169 (1929); J. Howland Auchincloss, 11 B. T. A. 947 (1928); William K.
Vanderbilt, 11 B. T. A. 291 (1928); Walter R. McCarthy, 9 B. T. A. 525 (1927); Wil-
liam G. Frank, 6 B. T. A. 1071 (1927) ; cf. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935).
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estate tax return as corpus precluded an income tax on the same items merely
because of the collection. 7 The payments subsequently received, it was held,
were realizations of capital -not income. In order to bring within the ambit
of the statutes these elusive receipts from earnings, Congress provided in
Section 42 of the Revenue Act of 19348 that amounts accrued up to the date
of the death of a taxpayer should be included in computing his net income
for his final taxable period, regardless of his previous method of accounting.
0
The effectiveness of this provision in closing the gap in the income tax
structure has been substantially lessened by a recent decision excluding from
the scope of the statute income earned through partnerships.10 Both the
decedent and his partnership, a law firm, kept their accounts on the cash
basis. Under an applicable state statute, death dissolved but did not terminate
the partnership." A financial analysis of the business by a surviving partner
as of the date of death disclosed firm assets in the form of cash on hand and
accounts receivable, as well as several hundred cases in process of litigation.
The accounts receivable represented fees billed to clients jor completed ser-
vices. The surviving partners formed a new partnership and agreed with
decedent's executors that the latter should receive decedent's share of the
earnings from the unfinished business as the new firm completed each case.1
2
The executors reported his share of cash in the firm's treasury in the income
tax return for his final taxable period. But they failed to include the amount
of his interest in the accounts receivable and the earnings from unfinished
business as appraised by the surviving partner for estate tax purposes. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, invoking Section 42, determined a defi-
ciency to the extent of those amounts and the Board of Tax Appeals, on
petition of the executors, upheld the additional assessment as valid.13 The
7. The estate is liable for income tax, however, on the amount by which the actual
receipts exceed the valuation of decedent's interest as included in the corpus. See the cases
cited in note 6 supra.
8. The provision, also incorporated as § 42 in the lxvr. RM'. CODE (1939) and in the
Revenue Acts of 1938 and 1936, reads in part: "In the case of the death of a taxpayer
there shall be included in computing net income for the taxable period in which falls the
date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date of his death if not othervise properly
includible in respect of such period or a prior period."
9. The general purpose of the provision is indicated by the following extract from
the report of the Committee on WNays and *Means: "The courts have held that income
accrued by a decedent on the cash basis prior to his death is not income to the estate,
and under the present law, unless income is taxable to the decedent, it escapes income tax
altogether. . . . Section 42 has been drawvn to require the inclusion in the inc.me of a
decedent of all amounts accrued up to the date of his death regardless of the fact that
he may have kept his books on a cash basis." H. R. REP. Xo. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sss.
(1934) 24.
10. Enright's Estate v. Comm'r. 112 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941j j.
11. X. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 42, c. 1, §§ 29. 30. 31; Um:or : PAEM.-::-siZ, Ac-
§§ 29, 30, 31.
12. The fees were allocated as the income of the old or new firm and a pvrcntagS,
the earnings prior to decedent's death paid to thu estate.
13. The memorandum opinion of the board. rendered August 23. 193'1. is n'jt oficially
reported. The decision was entered November 21. 1939.
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Third Circuit Court, however, reversed 14 the Board on the theory that the
only partnership income accrued to a partner was that shown to be distribut-
able to him by the partnership return filed pursuant to Section 187 of the act.16
With one exception,'0 none of the federal revenue acts has directly imposed
an income tax on partnerships as such; partners are liable for the tax only
in their individual capacity.17 However, in its analysis of the taxing scheme
of the revenue acts with respect to partnerships, the court relies heavily on
Section 182, which requires that: "There shall be included in computing the
net income of each partner his distributive share, whether distributed or not,
of the net income of the partnership for the taxable year."' 8 This provision
is interpreted as a direction that a partner on the cash basis must nevertheless
use the accrual method in accounting for his income from the partnership.
Partnership income, according to the court, accrues-to a partner when it
becomes distributable to him as required to -be shown by the partnership
return. Since Section 182 and similar provisions in the earlier acts have
long operated to place a partner otherwise on a cash basis on the accrual
basis with respect to his partnership income, an application of Section 42
to a decedent partner, the court concluded, is superfluous.
Without relying on the court's theory, the earnings from unfinished business
may be classified as "unaccrued," even to the partnership - and a non-accrual
with respect to the partnership is, of course, a non-accrual with respect to
the decedent. In developing the nieaning of "accrued income" the courts have
invented, rather than adopted, an accounting concept. The term "accrual
accounting," regarded as ambiguous and accepted under protest by the ac-
counting profession, 9 has been recognized as the legal generic for almost all
methods other than those using a strict cash basis.20 Taxpayers, anxious to
minimize their book income and escape the corresponding tax burden, have
14. Enright's Estate v. Comm'r, 112 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
15. "Every partnership shall make a return for each taxable year, stating specifically
the items of its gross income and the deductions allowed by this title, and shall include in
the return the names and addresses of the individuals who would be entitled to share in the
net income if distributed and the amount of the distributive share of each individual. The
return shall be sworn to by any one of the partners." Similar provisions appear as § 187
of the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938, and of the INT. REv. CODE (1939).
16. The 1917 Excess Profits Tax Act, 40 STAT. 303, provided for a direct tax on
partnership income, but Congress abandoned the tax the following year.
17. Revenue Act of 1934, § 181; INT. REV. CODE § 181 (1939).
18. The word "distributive" in the statute has been interpreted as synonymous with
"proportionate." Earle v. Comm'r, 38 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930). If the part-
nership ordinarily reported income on an accrual basis, a partner, although on a cash
basis, would be required to include his distributive share of the accruals in his individual
return. See note 36 infra.
19. May, Taxable Income and the Accounting Bases for Determining It (1925) 40
J. Acc'rcY 248; May, Accrual Accounting and Reserves in Tax Practice (1925) 40 J.
Acc'TcY 470. ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY (Report of special committee on terminology
published under auspices of American Institute of Accountants, 1931) gives six alterna-
tive meanings to the word "accrue."
20. See Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes (1939) 87 U. or
PA. L. REv. 295; MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 166.
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often adopted hybrid methods of accounting combining cash and accrual bases.
To forestall such practices, the courts have approved 2 l regulations of the
commissioner compelling the use of a reasonably consistent method of ac-
counting for taxable income.'2 2 Two apparently indispensable requirements
for an accrual have been set: first, that the immediate right to receive payment
be conditional only on a lapse of time ;23 second, that the amount to be
received be reasonably ascertainable at the accrual date from events occurring
beforehand
2 4
In the instant case, the earnings of the partnership from unfinished busi-
ness failed to meet the latter of these requirements." The monetary value
of the firm's interest in its unfinished business remained indeterminate until
the completion of the pending cases by the members of the new firm. The
litigation of all the cases extended over more than a four year period and
the fees collected were based on the time devoted to the case, the expenses
incurred by the firm, the result obtained and the money involved.2 0 The
valuation of the decedent's interest by a surviving partner was at most a
careful conjecture. Although Section 42 operates to place a decedent on an
accrual basis, the outermost frontiers of the concept of accrued income never-
theless exclude his interest in the unfinished business of his firm.
2 7
The collectible accounts receivable, however, were both fixed liabilities
of the firm's debtors and definite amounts ascertainable at the date of death.
21. Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U. S. 115 (1930); Lucas v. American Code
Co., 280 U. S. 445 (1930) ; United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422 (1926) ; Vang v.
Lewellyn, 35 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
22. In the gradual development of a workable method of measuring income, the lay-
man's concept (as embodied in the 16th Amendment), accounting practices, economic
theory and administrative rulings have all played their parts. But the extended applica-
tion of § 42 will undoubtedly call for a greater contribution by administrative agencies
and the courts since the provision, in effect, shifts the initiative for selecting a system
from the taxpayer to the commissioner. It is to be expected that a detailed "legal method"
of accrual accounting will emerge.
23. See note 21 supra. For an Hohfeldian treatment of accrued income see Goldstone,
Aspects of Recognition of Taxable Income Upon the Accrual Basis (1934) 12 TAX Mao.
474.
24. Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U. S. 290 (1932); Lillian
0. Fehrman, 38 B. T. A. 37 (1938); Theodore Stanfield, 8 B. T. A. 787 (1927); Max
Schott, 5 B. T. A. 79 (1926). In the Fehrinan case, the board held decedent's salary
unaccrued at death under § 42 where the amount was a pro rata share of employer's
profits unascertainable until the end of the year.
25. An exception is necessary as to a small amount in fixed fee items. Since deced-
ent's share in these was immediately ascertainable, they may be appropriately classed
with the accounts receivable.
26. The board held to the contrary on the grounds that the evidence failed to show
a non-accrual of the various items in sufficient detail. But no further information seems
necessary in the face of the parties' stipu!ation that the amounts ultimately payable de-
pended on "the work done, taking into account the amounts involved, the results accom-
plished for clients, and the time and effort devoted to the cases" as well as "upon the
client being satisfied with the amounts of the fees charged." (Record, p. 43).
27. For a general discussion of the accrual of attorneys' fees under § 42 see Parlin,
loc. cit. supra note 20, at 307.
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Apparently, they represented income accrued to the partnership.28 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case essentially identical in facts, has held a
decedent partner's share in them taxable, under Section 42, as accrued in-
come,2 0 presumably refusing to recognize the theory of the instant case that
partnership income does -not accrue to a partner unless required to be reported
in the partnership return.30 As a premise to its argument the court in the
present case implicitly assumed a dichotomy between the income of a partner
and the income of his partnership. A contrary assumption would have neces-
sarily led the court to the opposite result: for, if the two are the same to the
extent of the partner's share, an accrual of the one is an accrual of the other
and all the decedent's accrued income is taxable under Section 42. The
premise was derived, however, from other provisions of the statute recog-
nizing the partnership as a distinct tax computing unit. A partnership must
file a return for the information of the commissioner stating its income and
the amounts distributable to its members. 31 It may employ a method of
accounting different from that of the partners.3 2 And its accounting period
need not be the same as that of the partners.3 3 From these provisions the
court surmised that the partnership was an income computing unit, under
the Revenue Acts, separate from its members and that, therefore, the income
of the partnership was distinct from that of the partners.
With a shift of emphasis, however, an argument to the contrary seems
equally convincing. Cases involving a variety of issues have held that the
provisions of the Revenue Acts relevant to partnerships incorporate the
"aggregate theory" of the common law, rather than the "entity theory" of
the civil and mercantile law.3 4 Evidence of the intent of Congress has been
found in the series of statutory provisions taxing partners on partnership
income only in their individual capacity. Section 182 itself is interpreted as
recognizing the partnership as an aggregate, since a member must report his
share of partnership income regardless of whether or not it has been dis-
tributed. Invoking these statutory provisions and the cases interpreting them,
it may be argued that Section 182 does not require a partner on the cash
28. See Elizabeth G. Lambert, 40 B. T. A. 802 (1939) (collectible accounts receivable
held accrued income under § 42 to an attorney practicing alone).
29. Pfaff v. Comm'r, 113 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (per curiam). A petition
for a writ of certiorari has been filed with the Supreme Court both in the instant case
and in the Pfaff case on the basis of the conflict between the circuits. In the Pfaff case
the executors of the estate of a decedent physician, a member of a medical partnership,
were required by the court to pay income tax for decedent on accounts outstanding for
services rendered patients by the partnership during decedent's lifetime. The case differs
essentially from the present one only in that the fact of earnings from unfinished business
does not appear.
30. No opinion was rendered in the case.
31. Revenue Act of 1934, § 187. See note 15 supra.
32. Finucane v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 663 (1937).
33. REVENUE AcT OF 1934, § 188 (a) ; INT. REV. CODE § 188 (1939). See Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 303 U. S. 493 (1938).
34. Harris v. Comm'r, 39 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; United States v. Coulby,
258 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919); Augustine M. Lloyd, 15 B. T. A. 82 (1929) ; Humphrey
Barton, 13 B.T.A. 1184 (1928); Alpin J. Cameron, 8 B.T.A. 120 (1927). See (1935)
35 COL. L. Rxv. 796.
[Vol. 50
NOTES
basis to include as an accrued item of his individual income his undistributed
share of partnership income; but, to the contrary, he complies with the pro-
vision by reporting the share as his own, completely realized income. And
consequently, since no distinction can soundly be made between a taxpayer's
partnership and individual income, Section 42 applies to both. The point
that a partnership is a distinct tax computing unit does not seem an adequate
refutation. 35
The same process of statutory interpretation developed by the court in
the instant case has, however, been followed by the courts and the Board
in consistently holding that a partner on the cash basis must report in his
individual return his share of accrued partnership income where the firm
keeps its accounts on an accrual basis.30 A holding to the contrary would
require the partnership to keep two sets of books, one for the more adequate
reflection of income and the other for the computation of a partner's taxes.
The "separate taxable entity" theory has led without difficulty to a more
expedient and reasonable conclusion.
The instant case presents a fact set-up essentially converse to that of these
cases: here, the partnership computes its income on the cash basis, and Sec-
tion 42 operates to place the decedent on an accrual basis. But a similar
holding on the converse facts does not necessarily follow. 3 7 The objectionable
consequence of a double accounting system throughout the life of the part-
nership does not here appear. And more significantly, the new element of
a portion of a decedent's earnings escaping taxation is present.
If legislative intent is the determinative factor in a decision of the appli-
cability of Section 42 to decedent partners, the approach of marshalling various
provisions of the statute to support either the aggregate or entity doctrines
seems an inadequate substitute for a direct examination of the broader policy
of the statute. A holding in favor of the Commissioner seems more consonant
with the general purpose of the act to levy and collect taxes upon the "net
income of every individual."38 The particular provisions of the statute rele-
vant to partnerships appear to have been designed for conveniently and ex-
pediently accomplishing this purpose, without promulgating any general theory
of partnership law. To exclude a decedent's income from the operation of
Section 42 by interposing the partnership as a barrier leaves a portion of
his earnings still tax free. Since they may be regarded as satisfying the
technical requirements for an accrual, a less narrow construction than that
of the court more adequately fills the gap existing before enactment of the
provision.
35. In accounting practice, even a business owned by a single individual is treated
as an income computing entity. The personal assets and transactions of the owner are
not entered on the books. A partnership may likewise be regarded as an accounting unit
without separating the ownership of income.
36. Finucane v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 663 (1937) ; Truman v. United States, 4
F. Supp. 447 (N. D. Ill. 1933); Lord Forres, 25 B. T. A. 154 (1932); Fritz Hill, 22
B. T. A. 1079 (1931); V. J. Bums, 12 B. T. A. 1209 (1928); Laurence D. Miller,
7 B. T. A. 581 (1927); John F. Cooke, 4 B. T. A. 916 (1926); Percival H. Truman,
3 B. T. A. 386 (1926).
37. To the contrary, see Parlin, loc. cit. supra note 20, at 304.
38. Rrvmcxun Acr oF 1934, § 11; INrr. Rav. CoDE § 11 (1939).
19403
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
NEW YORK'S PROPOSED RENT CONTROL ACT
THE United States as a whole is suffering from a serious housing shortage
comparable to the one at the close of the last war.' The shortage, which is
particularly acute in the lower rent levels and greatly impedes the demolition
of unfit dwellings, inevitably leads to excessive rent charges for even the
most rudimentary shelter. Further housing demands may also be expected in
many areas which already have a shortage, for the national defense pro-
gram's increased industrial activity will attract large numbers of people,
many of whom, according to past experience, will remain in the city per-
manently.2 Based on the belief that serious shortages are imminent a bill
proposing rent control was introduced into the New York Senate in March,
1940.3
While not an innovation of the First World War, rent control measures
calculated to prevent rent profiteering were not widely used until that time.
4
The first step in those countries actively engaged in hostilities took the form
of protection for the dependents of men in the armed services; but sooner
or later it was found necessary to extend this benefit to the rest of the
population. In the United States, federal,0 state,0 and local1 governments
1. DRELLICH AND EMERY, RENT CONTROL IN WAR AND PEACE (1939) 75, 101.
WOOD, INTRODUCTION To HousING, FACTS AND PRINCIPLE (1939) 69. The article in N. Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1940, p. 45, Col. 6, indicating that on the basis of figures compiled by
the United States Bureau of the Census, New York City had a vacancy average
of 7.6% in contrast to a 5% average in 176 cities with populations of 25,000 or more may
be highly misleading. There is no breakdown to show the situation in the various rent
levels, and the percentage apparently includes even the most obsolescent structures.
2. Increase in the marriage rate accompanies such concentration of population in
crises. This has an important effect, as it is primarily the number of families, rather
than the number of people, which determines the demand for dwellings. FruEDRud, REnNT
REGULATION (1934) 13 ENCYC. SOC. SCIENcEs 294.
3. Introduced as S. I. 2111. See also A. I. 355 and 356, proposing legislation similar
to the Emergency Rent Laws of 1920. See note 9 in ra.
4. Schaub, The Regulation of Rental During the War Period (1920) 28 J. POL.
ECON. 1.
5. Congress gave the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. author-
ity to condemn land and requisition buildings to house its employees, 40 STAT. 438 (1918).
Condemnation was usually used as a potential threat to compel reasonable rentals. Rep-
resentative Darrow introduced a bill (H. R. 12443) to strike at rent profiteering through-
out the country. It was to apply to municipalities of 30,000 or more, and to such other
areas as the President might designate. Monthly rentals of more than $50 did not come
within the bill. But neither this nor the Crosser Bill (H. R. 12533) were successful. The
District of Columbia received special attention. Four bills, known respectively as the
Johnson (H. R. 9248), Pomerene (S. 4770), and Tinkham (H. R. 10162 and H. R. 10202)
Bills, were introduced in the winter of 1918; but it was not until May 31st, when the
situation was more than critical, that the Saulsbury Resolution was enacted, 40 STAT.
593 (1918).
6. In Massachusetts, the Governor was empowered to take possession "of any land
or buildings" whenever he believed "it necessary or expedient" for the purpose of better
securing the public safety or the defense or welfare of the commonwealth, Mass. Gen.
Acts, 1917, c. 342. A constitutional amendment (c. 6, art. 47, 1917), supplemented by
Mass. Gen, Acts, 1918, c. 205, was also passed permitting the state and cities to engage
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took measures of varying efficacy to regulate rent profiteering. The most
dramatic situation in this country,8 however, came after the war when, in
September 1920, the New York legislature, faced by the certain eviction
of hundreds of thousands of tenants unable to meet the new rents, met in
special session and passed rent control legislation.0 Enacted in the shadow
of an emergency, the legislation was hasty and not too well considered. The
present bill is an attempt to avoid the hasty consideration attendant upon
emergency measures. If enacted, it is designed to be a permanent statute,
frequently inoperative, but available for any eventuality.
in housing enterprises in time of "war, public exigency, emergency and distress." The
amendment and the constitutional revision of which it wvas part were subsequently con-
strued to be null and void. Opinioir of the Justices, 233 Mass. Wj3, 125 X. E. 849 (1920).
New Jersey, Acts of 1917, c. 126, gave added power to the Governor, who pursuant to
this power requested complaints against rent profiteering and illegitimate eviction, and
promised to have criminal actions instituted.
7. 126 localities set up committees consisting of representation of the various in-
terests. Some of these were organized by the Federal Government, others by State
Governors, the State Councils of Defense, and City Councils. The "Ctknmittee of Twenty-
Four" in New London, Connecticut, the most widely publicized, was used as a model by
many communities. Representing organized labor, manufacturers and the general pub-
lic, it was divided into four adjustment boards, which met in rotation, heard complaints,
and determined fair rents. Failure to comply with a settlement was published in the
local press, which action, due to war psychology, usually was effective. Sometimes
higher assessments were threatened, and if the recalcitrant's building violated health or
fire ordinances, the proper authorities were induced to take action. Scdunv, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 26.
. 8. New York was not the only state or locality, however, which took action after
the war. Del. Laws, 1921, c. 215, forbade a landlord to increase his rental demand b-
cause the family of tenants or prospective tenants had children. In 1921 Denver established
a'lfunicipal Rent Commission by ordinance, which held rentals to slightly more than a
12% gross return on the value of the property. Ill. Laws, 52 Gen. Assem., 1921, 504,
provided that during the period of emergency a hold-over tenant would nut be liable for
more than the regular rental. In 1921 Los Angeles had an anti-rent profiteering ordi-
nance for a short time until the Superior Court held it invalid; it permitted the landlord
to ask for an amount not exceeding 11% of the investment in the building. Maine Laws,
1919 (Special Session), c. 256, made a demand for unfair rental a penal offense. Mass.
Gen. Acts, 1920, c. 578, permitted the defense in a rent action of unreasonableness and
oppressiveness, and an increase in rent of 25% over the previous year was presumptively
unreasonable. Wis. Laws, 1920 (Special Sess.), c. 16, gave the Railroad Commission
power to fix valuations upon which rates for reasonable rents could be based. The law
applied only to Milvaukee and because of this it was held to be discriminatory in State
ex rel. Milwaukee Sales & Inv. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 183 N. W. (7 (Wis. 1921).
9. Acting upon REPORT OF THE HOUSING COMMITTEE OF RECONSmUCrIO Co0.1nIs-
SION OF THE STATh OF NnW YoRx submitted March 26, 1920, the New York Legislature
in the following month passed the first and second of the state's emergency rent laws
(N. Y. Laws of 1920, c. 130-139 and 209-211). In September Chapters 942-9.53, de-
signed to strengthen and correct the earlier acts, were added. In New York building
costs were 140% higher in January, 1920, than in 1916. Mortgage money vas practically
unobtainable; and for several years past demolition of old buildings more than equalled
new building. Not until 1929 did New York completely abandon rent control legislation.
1940]
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As proposed, the Rent Control Act is predicated on the existence of an
emergency endangering the welfare, health, and morals of the people.10 It
was formerly the practice for the legislature to declare an emergency after
a short hearing. The proposed Act, however, states than an emergency exists
when the vacancies in a class of housing are less than five per cent. An
Emergency Rent Control Board of five members is created, which by means
of a research bureau is to maintain a perpetual inventory of vacancies in
all dwellings in the state. The Board is to classify dwellings on the basis
of location, size, scale of rentals, and other reasonable factors. It is further
to publish, at least every six months, a determination of the percentage of
vacancies in every class of housing established by it, and if the percentage
is less than four per cent, the rents of all dwelling units in such class of
housing shall be controlled. When the Board determines that in any con-
trolled class the percentage of vacancies has risen to four and one-half per
cent, but is less than five per cent, the rents in this class shall be decontrolled.
During the period of decontrol, a cumulative increment of not more than
five per cent of the maximum rent permitted at the beginning of the decontrol
period may be made in each successive period of six months. If the vacancies
are five per cent or more, the dwelling units in such class shall not be con-
trolled. The maximum monthly rent which may be demanded or received
for a dwelling unit during the period of control shall be the average monthly
rent charged for such unit by the landlord during the year prior to the control
period. In no event shall the maximum monthly rent exceed by twenty-five
per cent the lowest rent charged during such year, unless, upon petition of
the landlord, the Board permits an increase sufficient to provide a reasonable
return upon the net additional value of any capital improvements male
during the control period. The Board, on petition of the tenant, or upon
its own motion, may lower the maximum rent by an amount equal to the
reduced rental value of the dwelling unit caused by depreciation, deterioration,
or reduction in services. The Act also contains appropriate provisions for
administrative hearings and judicial review.'1
10. Impairment of the landlord's freedom of contract permitted by the proposed Act
is carefully confined, and it does not go beyond what Mr. Justice Holmes declared to be
permissible in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921), 16 A. L. R. 165, 178 (1922) ; cf.
Marcus Brown Holding Co., Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921), upholding all the
New York Emergency Rent Laws. The New York Court of Appeals took a like stand
in People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921),
appeal dismilssed, 257 U. S. 665; Levy Leasing Co., Inc. v. Siegel, 230 N. Y. 634, 130
N. E. 923 (1921) ; Guttag v. Shatzkin, 230 N. Y. 647, 130 N. E. 929 (1921). Critics have
suggested that although the proposed Act is presumably not open to successful attack as
a violation of due process, it may be held to constitute an improper delegation of power
by the Legislature. This view seems most questionable, however, in the light of Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), and Moses v. Guaranteed Mtge. Co., 264 N. Y.
476, 191 N. E. 523 (1934), rehearing denied, 264 N. Y. 601, 191 N. E. 584 (1934).
11. Where the size of the dwelling unit has changed, or the unit has not been rented
during the whole of the year previous to the period of control, or there is insufficient data
to enable an average rental to be computed, the Board shall, either on petition or on its
own motion, determine the maximum rent to be charged by the rent of comparable dwell-
ing units or in any other way it deems practicable. Whenever the Board determines
that there has been a general increase or decrease in the cost of maintaining or servicing
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Conspicuous by its absence from the Act is any limit on the class of dwell-
ings controlled. Since the emergency shortage does not extend to upper rent
classes, constitutional, administrative and political objections suggest the
desirability of an upper limit on control either in the statute or by clear
mandate to the Commission. Selection of such a limit will of course be
arbitrary. A limitation of regulation to rentals of $800 a year would include
more than all of those persons now affected by the Wages and Hours Act
and the Social Security Act.
12
There have been three basic methods of administering rent control acts.
New York, in 1920, turned the problem over to the courts ;13 in 1915 New
South Wales, apparently following the Irish example, established a fair
rent court;14 the District of Columbia had a rent commission. 15 For effec-
tive solution, the rent control problem requires administration by either a
special rent court or commission. The courts would be unduly burdened
by the lengthy investigations probably necessary to enforce even the most
specific statute.16  Past experience in New York, moreover, indicates that
under court administration widely divergent results ensue.17
dwellings in any controlled class, it shall, after a public hearing, permit or require a
general change in the maximum rent. Whenever a nmaximum rent of a dwelling unit is
to be determined, the Board shall notify the tenant and landlord and give them the
opportunity to be heard before a trial examiner, who shall determine the maximum rent
to be charged. The landlord or tenant may, within ten days after notice of the deter-
mination, appeal to the Board which may decide the case on the record or after argu-
ment. A party may obtain review of a final order by the Board in the Special Term of
the Supreme Court in the county in which the property is located. The Board's findings
of fact, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. The Act further provides that in any
summary proceeding based upon non-payment of rent, the tenant who alleges that the
rent charged is higher than the maximum permitted must deposit vith the clerk a sum
equal to the rent in arrears computed at a monthly rate last paid or reserved. The court
shall strike out the defense if the tenant fails to make such a deposit. The landlord may
recover possession during a period of control or decontrol under Article 63 of the Civil
Practice Act if he can show that the tenant is objectionable, or where the landlord seeks
in good faith to recover possession for personal occupancy, or where the landlord intends
to demolish the building for new construction. The Act also provides that wilful demand
or receipt by the landlord or his agent, of an excessive rent, is a misdemeanor. The tenant
may not waive any provision of the Act in his lease or in any other agreement. The Act
exempts housing under the jurisdiction of the Division of Housing or any other housing
authority, or housing forming a part of a rented farm. New buildings completed and
occupied within one year of the period of control are also exempt.
12. A limitation of $800 would undoubtedly deny the benefits of the act to profes-
sional people and small business men, who frequently need protection during a housing
shortage. Accordingly there may be some argument for setting the limit at $1500 yearly.
13. N. Y. Laws, 1920, c. 131-139, 209-211, and 942-953.
14. Evatt, A "Fair Rent" Expcrimcnt in Nea, South Wales, 2 J. CoUP. LEG. & l.;T.
L. (3d Series) 10.
15. The Ball Rent Law, 41 STAT. 298 (1919).
16. But the courts may be constitutionally bound to set rates based on their own
findings. Cf. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 3S, 51 (1936).
17. In Graeber v. Nichols, 190 N. Y. Supp. 193 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 1920) the
question of whether a rent was fair or not was left to the jury. This method of deter-
mination is even less likely to insure consistency over a period of time.
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Whichever agency of administration is chosen, its most difficult problem
will be the determination of a fair rent. Any method of determination is to
a large extent arbitrary; but that is not objectionable, providing the method
seems reasonable and fair. The New York Act of 1920 spoke of a "fair rent,"
which was an invitation to divergence and controversy. The New York
courts were not laggard in accepting the invitation. Commencing with March-
banks v. Moore,'8 it was held that a fair rent depended on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and there was no hard and fast rule to guide the
court and jury. Within the year, however, two major formulas emerged.
In Hall Realty Company v. Moos'0 the Appellate Term of the First Depart-
ment condemned market value as a false standard upon which to calculate
a fair rent, for market value was dependent on rents; instead it endorsed as
sound a reasonable income on investment. The market value formula, ad-
vanced in Hirsch v. Weiner 20 by the Appellate Term of the Second Depart-
ment, was ten per cent of the present or market value plus an allowance
for operating expenses. 21 This case attacked the Moos standard of a reason-
able income on investment as creating a different rule for each landlord.
Each court saw the weakness of the other's rule, without being aware of
frailties of its own rule.
Despite the development of formulas, courts in New York and elsewhere 22
which concerned themselves with determining a "fair rent" considered as
pertinent nearly all the evidence offered, whether it related to building cost,
amount of investment, market value, replacement cost, assessed valuation,
operating cost, depreciation, cost of capital improvements or cost and rentals
of similar buildings, and whether applicable to the formula employed. The
courts apparently hoped to fuse this welter of evidence into a figure which
would give the landlord a fair return. Thus was the much criticized Smyth
v. Ames 23 doctrine applied to housing. The courts were disposed to emphasize
replacement cost, which - even assuming an intention to replace - is usually
an upper limit rather than a measure of value. The prudent investment
doctrine was not used.24 The courts assumed that a fair rent could be deter-
18. 113 Misc. Rep. 647, 185 N. Y. Supp. 226 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1920).
19. 115 Misc. Rep. 506, 188 N. Y. Supp. 858 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1921), aff'd,
200 App. Div. 66, 192 N. Y. Supp. 530 (1st Dep't 1922).
20. 116 Misc. Rep. 312, 190 N. Y. Supp. 111 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 1921).
21. A net return of 10% was not considered excessive; actually this figure represents
what should be the gross return unless landlords are to receive preferential treatment.
22. Karrick v. Cantrill, 277 Fed. 578 (App. D. C. 1922) ; Forster v. Eliot, 282 Fed.
735 (App. D. C. 1922); Kennedy Bros., Inc. v. Sinclair, 287 Fed. 972 (App. D. C. 1923);
Maitland v. Kerrigan, 187 N. Y. Supp. 495 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1921) ; Schwartz v.
Deutsch, 187 N. Y. Supp. 521 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1921) ; see Finch, J., dissenting in
Schwartz Co., Inc. v. Leyendecker, 190 N. Y. Supp. 520 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1921).
23. 169 U. S. 466 (1898). For discussion of valuations for rate making purposes see
Hale, Conflicting Judicial Criteria of Utility Rates-The Need For A Judiclal Restate-
ment (1938) 38 COL. L. Rv. 959.
24. Advocated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a concurring opinion in the public service
case of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. of Missouri,
262 U. S. 276, 289 (1923).
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mined by ascertaining the value of the property or the value of the capital
invested in it.25 A fair rent, however, must be a compromise between what
the tenant can pay and what the landlord should get.-0 There is no universal*
formula for its determination; but an average of rents paid in a period of
free choice is as satisfactory as any device yet suggested. It avoids completely
the valuation morass to be encountered in the public utility cases.
In providing that the maximum monthly rent shall be determined by the
average charged in the year prior to control, the Act goes a step further than
has the United Kingdom under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest
Acts.2 7 The latter legislation takes a specific, historical date as a fair rent
standard, rather than a period of time preceding the onset of control. The
English experience 28 indicates that the further away the control period was
from that date, the more important improvements and depreciation bulked,
until they, rather than the rent at a specific date, were the important factors.
Therefore, a period of time is preferable. Perhaps a longer period should be
substituted for the one year period now provided in the New York Act, since
it is evident that in the year preceding a period of control, rent charges begin
to reflect the increasing shortage. Of course, the Board will on occasion
have to determine whether petitions for increases or decreases should be
granted, and in doing this it will have to consider improvements or depre-
ciation, and added or lessened services.
An objection frequently raised to price control measures -of which rent
control is one - is the rigidity and price disparity thus introduced into the
economic system. Such a criticism may be especially pertinent to state control
unarticulated to contemporaneous federal controls such as those over wages
and agricultural purchasing power.20 The importance of these economic con-
siderations as a criticism of the Rent Control Act, however, is largely mitigated
by the Act's provision permitting a twenty-five per cent leeway in the setting
of maximum rents when expenses have increased z° Direct price control
25. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (lst ed. 1937) 1165.
26. The goal which should be sought in privately financed housing is to obtain for
the tenant the best accommodation at a reasonable rate which %ill attract capital. Note
(1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 802.
27. The Rent and .2fortgage Interest Restrictions Acts, 1920 to 1939, which consist
of eight acts amending and supplementing the first four acts: 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 17;
13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 13; 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 32; 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 18, which are referred to
as "the principal Acts."
28. REPORTS OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE RENT REsTRICrIoNS
Acrs, 1937-1938, [Cmd. 5261] xv. 217; SAFFORD, THE RENT AND MORTGAGE INTEREST
RrsnIcroNs Acts, 1920 To 1938 (1938); WOODFAL, LAW OF LANDLORD D TEm AT
(24th ed. with Supp. No. 1, 1939) 345-367, Supp. 9-15. On the interesting Russian
experience, see HAZARD, SoviET HOusING LAWS (1939) 38 et seq.
29. In the event of war the Federal Government will redouble its efforts to keep prices
down and prevent profiteering in all fields of enterprise. For past history and present
intentions see TOBIN AND BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIvmLIA AsmEcA (1940) 163 et seq.
30. Rent shortages are usually a concomitant of rising prices; in theory, however,
rigid rents resulting from control during periods of declining prices would cut deeply
into tenants' declining purchasing power.
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such as that embodied in the Rent Control Act must also be evaluated along-
side a slightly less direct method of checking rent prices - increasing the
housing supply. Present housing projects, both state and federal, are a start
in that direction, although thus far the results of such building have been
slum clearance rather than an increase in the supply. Until public and private
housing can generate a sufficient supply, the proposed Act seems a praise-
worthy solution to a pressing public need."'
31. For a discussion of the desirability of a plan similar to that of New York see
HARDY, WARTIME CONTROL OF PRICES (Brookings Inst. 1940) 206.
